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We noticed a flash of lightning that just occurred at the north of our track. Using the WX radar we were only able to paint light to medium precipitation at north of our track. Looking ahead visually we saw nothing but clear sky and stars above, but there was no moon yet and it was very dark. The dispatcher said in an ASARS (aircraft communication addressing and reporting system) message just minutes before that all the rides ahead had been reported smooth. All of a sudden the overspeed EICAS and aural warnings went off and the captain immediately retarded the throttles and turned off the auto throttles and autopilot. He told me to turn on the seatbelt sign and the ignition switches to continuous. He was battling very hard as we immediately started climbing at about 3000 fpm. I then told the flight attendants over the PA to take their seats immediately. The captain finally got control of the aircraft as we were approaching FL370, and then eased it back down to FL350. The turbulence we encountered was moderate to severe as for a few moments we were unable to control the aircraft. During the steep climb I made a transmission to any other aircraft that might be along our track, but fortunately we were ahead of the track that night. We talked to the flight attendants right away and it has aggravated a previous back injury. No passenger was even out of their seats so that was good. No other flights behind us encountered anything other than a little light to moderate chop. We notified commercial radio immediately and had them pass everything along to dispatch, who talked with us eventually on a phone patch. We made a logbook entry and after a cabin inspection and group discussion we deemed the aircraft able to continue on to our destination.5.How many passengers were injured during the event?
We noticed a flash of lightning that just occurred at the north of our track. Using the WX radar we were only able to paint light to medium precipitation at north of our track. Looking ahead visually we saw nothing but clear sky and stars above, but there was no moon yet and it was very dark. The dispatcher said in an ASARS (aircraft communication addressing and reporting system) message just minutes before that all the rides ahead had been reported smooth. All of a sudden the overspeed EICAS and aural warnings went off and the captain immediately retarded the throttles and turned off the auto throttles and autopilot. He told me to turn on the seatbelt sign and the ignition switches to continuous. He was battling very hard as we immediately started climbing at about 3000 fpm. I then told the flight attendants over the PA to take their seats immediately. The captain finally got control of the aircraft as we were approaching FL370, and then eased it back down to FL350. The turbulence we encountered was moderate to severe as for a few moments we were unable to control the aircraft. During the steep climb I made a transmission to any other aircraft that might be along our track, but fortunately we were ahead of the track that night. We talked to the flight attendants right away and it has aggravated a previous back injury. No passenger was even out of their seats so that was good. No other flights behind us encountered anything other than a little light to moderate chop. We notified commercial radio immediately and had them pass everything along to dispatch, who talked with us eventually on a phone patch. We made a logbook entry and after a cabin inspection and group discussion we deemed the aircraft able to continue on to our destination.4.Who told the flight attendants over the PA to take their seats immediately?
We noticed a flash of lightning that just occurred at the north of our track. Using the WX radar we were only able to paint light to medium precipitation at north of our track. Looking ahead visually we saw nothing but clear sky and stars above, but there was no moon yet and it was very dark. The dispatcher said in an ASARS (aircraft communication addressing and reporting system) message just minutes before that all the rides ahead had been reported smooth. All of a sudden the overspeed EICAS and aural warnings went off and the captain immediately retarded the throttles and turned off the auto throttles and autopilot. He told me to turn on the seatbelt sign and the ignition switches to continuous. He was battling very hard as we immediately started climbing at about 3000 fpm. I then told the flight attendants over the PA to take their seats immediately. The captain finally got control of the aircraft as we were approaching FL370, and then eased it back down to FL350. The turbulence we encountered was moderate to severe as for a few moments we were unable to control the aircraft. During the steep climb I made a transmission to any other aircraft that might be along our track, but fortunately we were ahead of the track that night. We talked to the flight attendants right away and it has aggravated a previous back injury. No passenger was even out of their seats so that was good. No other flights behind us encountered anything other than a little light to moderate chop. We notified commercial radio immediately and had them pass everything along to dispatch, who talked with us eventually on a phone patch. We made a logbook entry and after a cabin inspection and group discussion we deemed the aircraft able to continue on to our destination.3.Why did the captain direct the first officer to turn on the seatbelt sign and the ignition switches to continuous?
We noticed a flash of lightning that just occurred at the north of our track. Using the WX radar we were only able to paint light to medium precipitation at north of our track. Looking ahead visually we saw nothing but clear sky and stars above, but there was no moon yet and it was very dark. The dispatcher said in an ASARS (aircraft communication addressing and reporting system) message just minutes before that all the rides ahead had been reported smooth. All of a sudden the overspeed EICAS and aural warnings went off and the captain immediately retarded the throttles and turned off the auto throttles and autopilot. He told me to turn on the seatbelt sign and the ignition switches to continuous. He was battling very hard as we immediately started climbing at about 3000 fpm. I then told the flight attendants over the PA to take their seats immediately. The captain finally got control of the aircraft as we were approaching FL370, and then eased it back down to FL350. The turbulence we encountered was moderate to severe as for a few moments we were unable to control the aircraft. During the steep climb I made a transmission to any other aircraft that might be along our track, but fortunately we were ahead of the track that night. We talked to the flight attendants right away and it has aggravated a previous back injury. No passenger was even out of their seats so that was good. No other flights behind us encountered anything other than a little light to moderate chop. We notified commercial radio immediately and had them pass everything along to dispatch, who talked with us eventually on a phone patch. We made a logbook entry and after a cabin inspection and group discussion we deemed the aircraft able to continue on to our destination.2.What did the crew see in the sky ahead?
We noticed a flash of lightning that just occurred at the north of our track. Using the WX radar we were only able to paint light to medium precipitation at north of our track. Looking ahead visually we saw nothing but clear sky and stars above, but there was no moon yet and it was very dark. The dispatcher said in an ASARS (aircraft communication addressing and reporting system) message just minutes before that all the rides ahead had been reported smooth. All of a sudden the overspeed EICAS and aural warnings went off and the captain immediately retarded the throttles and turned off the auto throttles and autopilot. He told me to turn on the seatbelt sign and the ignition switches to continuous. He was battling very hard as we immediately started climbing at about 3000 fpm. I then told the flight attendants over the PA to take their seats immediately. The captain finally got control of the aircraft as we were approaching FL370, and then eased it back down to FL350. The turbulence we encountered was moderate to severe as for a few moments we were unable to control the aircraft. During the steep climb I made a transmission to any other aircraft that might be along our track, but fortunately we were ahead of the track that night. We talked to the flight attendants right away and it has aggravated a previous back injury. No passenger was even out of their seats so that was good. No other flights behind us encountered anything other than a little light to moderate chop. We notified commercial radio immediately and had them pass everything along to dispatch, who talked with us eventually on a phone patch. We made a logbook entry and after a cabin inspection and group discussion we deemed the aircraft able to continue on to our destination.1.How was the weather to the north of the track according to the WX radar?
Automation promises great results for the controller. Technical advances are expected to improve the performance of the human-machine system, and controllers assumed to be flexible enough to adapt to the new working environment. But partial automation can actually increase the risk of error attributable to human operators. This is because they are expected to monitor systems that are harder to understand and to exercise their skills only intermittently. In the US, the FAA’s Automated En-route ATC programme is designed to detect potential conflicts up to 20 minutes before they occur. It generates a resolution immediately, and provides simulation capabilities.As a result, the controller deals only with aircraft that the system says need attention, and while he/she has to rely on the system to detect problems and provide resolutions. The controller resolves them as soon as they are detected rather than wait to assess them visually on the situation display, so the focus of attention shifts from tactical monitoring, problem analysis and coordination toward strategic planning tasks.Many French controllers query this philosophy. Applied to French airspace, it could, mean a controller has to transmit a revised clearance to an aircraft in his sector to avoid a predicted conflict in another sector with an aircraft currently in a third. And if he disagrees with the clearance, he will have to propose an alternative without having access to information on what is happening in the other two sectors. If the controller’s role is limited to transmitting machine-generated clearances, he will soon lose his ability to make control decisions. CENA is developing an alternative at its Toulouse training centre. The En-Route Air Traffic Organizer (ERATO) is a software program to cope with what CENA terms the capacity barrier. It takes all the information available from sensors and flight plans, plus intention data obtained by data link from aircraft to create a working airspace model. The scenario it presents can identify and prioritize potential conflicts, and offer tool to resolve them. To do this, ERATO enlists the support of artificial intelligence techniques. It can describe the mental activity of controller, and assess deterioration under pressure of time, fatigue and stress. The central question is to identify the conditions under which the controller’s knowledge ceases to be accessible. It also sets out to identify and predict sources of error.5.（ ） is designed to identify the conditions under which the controller’s knowledge ceased to be accessible.
Automation promises great results for the controller. Technical advances are expected to improve the performance of the human-machine system, and controllers assumed to be flexible enough to adapt to the new working environment. But partial automation can actually increase the risk of error attributable to human operators. This is because they are expected to monitor systems that are harder to understand and to exercise their skills only intermittently. In the US, the FAA’s Automated En-route ATC programme is designed to detect potential conflicts up to 20 minutes before they occur. It generates a resolution immediately, and provides simulation capabilities.As a result, the controller deals only with aircraft that the system says need attention, and while he/she has to rely on the system to detect problems and provide resolutions. The controller resolves them as soon as they are detected rather than wait to assess them visually on the situation display, so the focus of attention shifts from tactical monitoring, problem analysis and coordination toward strategic planning tasks.Many French controllers query this philosophy. Applied to French airspace, it could, mean a controller has to transmit a revised clearance to an aircraft in his sector to avoid a predicted conflict in another sector with an aircraft currently in a third. And if he disagrees with the clearance, he will have to propose an alternative without having access to information on what is happening in the other two sectors. If the controller’s role is limited to transmitting machine-generated clearances, he will soon lose his ability to make control decisions. CENA is developing an alternative at its Toulouse training centre. The En-Route Air Traffic Organizer (ERATO) is a software program to cope with what CENA terms the capacity barrier. It takes all the information available from sensors and flight plans, plus intention data obtained by data link from aircraft to create a working airspace model. The scenario it presents can identify and prioritize potential conflicts, and offer tool to resolve them. To do this, ERATO enlists the support of artificial intelligence techniques. It can describe the mental activity of controller, and assess deterioration under pressure of time, fatigue and stress. The central question is to identify the conditions under which the controller’s knowledge ceases to be accessible. It also sets out to identify and predict sources of error.4.ERATO is designed to （ ） ．
Automation promises great results for the controller. Technical advances are expected to improve the performance of the human-machine system, and controllers assumed to be flexible enough to adapt to the new working environment. But partial automation can actually increase the risk of error attributable to human operators. This is because they are expected to monitor systems that are harder to understand and to exercise their skills only intermittently. In the US, the FAA’s Automated En-route ATC programme is designed to detect potential conflicts up to 20 minutes before they occur. It generates a resolution immediately, and provides simulation capabilities.As a result, the controller deals only with aircraft that the system says need attention, and while he/she has to rely on the system to detect problems and provide resolutions. The controller resolves them as soon as they are detected rather than wait to assess them visually on the situation display, so the focus of attention shifts from tactical monitoring, problem analysis and coordination toward strategic planning tasks.Many French controllers query this philosophy. Applied to French airspace, it could, mean a controller has to transmit a revised clearance to an aircraft in his sector to avoid a predicted conflict in another sector with an aircraft currently in a third. And if he disagrees with the clearance, he will have to propose an alternative without having access to information on what is happening in the other two sectors. If the controller’s role is limited to transmitting machine-generated clearances, he will soon lose his ability to make control decisions. CENA is developing an alternative at its Toulouse training centre. The En-Route Air Traffic Organizer (ERATO) is a software program to cope with what CENA terms the capacity barrier. It takes all the information available from sensors and flight plans, plus intention data obtained by data link from aircraft to create a working airspace model. The scenario it presents can identify and prioritize potential conflicts, and offer tool to resolve them. To do this, ERATO enlists the support of artificial intelligence techniques. It can describe the mental activity of controller, and assess deterioration under pressure of time, fatigue and stress. The central question is to identify the conditions under which the controller’s knowledge ceases to be accessible. It also sets out to identify and predict sources of error. 3.With newer systems, controllers （ ） ．
Automation promises great results for the controller. Technical advances are expected to improve the performance of the human-machine system, and controllers assumed to be flexible enough to adapt to the new working environment. But partial automation can actually increase the risk of error attributable to human operators. This is because they are expected to monitor systems that are harder to understand and to exercise their skills only intermittently. In the US, the FAA’s Automated En-route ATC programme is designed to detect potential conflicts up to 20 minutes before they occur. It generates a resolution immediately, and provides simulation capabilities.As a result, the controller deals only with aircraft that the system says need attention, and while he/she has to rely on the system to detect problems and provide resolutions. The controller resolves them as soon as they are detected rather than wait to assess them visually on the situation display, so the focus of attention shifts from tactical monitoring, problem analysis and coordination toward strategic planning tasks.Many French controllers query this philosophy. Applied to French airspace, it could, mean a controller has to transmit a revised clearance to an aircraft in his sector to avoid a predicted conflict in another sector with an aircraft currently in a third. And if he disagrees with the clearance, he will have to propose an alternative without having access to information on what is happening in the other two sectors. If the controller’s role is limited to transmitting machine-generated clearances, he will soon lose his ability to make control decisions. CENA is developing an alternative at its Toulouse training centre. The En-Route Air Traffic Organizer (ERATO) is a software program to cope with what CENA terms the capacity barrier. It takes all the information available from sensors and flight plans, plus intention data obtained by data link from aircraft to create a working airspace model. The scenario it presents can identify and prioritize potential conflicts, and offer tool to resolve them. To do this, ERATO enlists the support of artificial intelligence techniques. It can describe the mental activity of controller, and assess deterioration under pressure of time, fatigue and stress. The central question is to identify the conditions under which the controller’s knowledge ceases to be accessible. It also sets out to identify and predict sources of error. 2.With older systems, controllers’ attention is focused on （ ） ．
Automation promises great results for the controller. Technical advances are expected to improve the performance of the human-machine system, and controllers assumed to be flexible enough to adapt to the new working environment. But partial automation can actually increase the risk of error attributable to human operators. This is because they are expected to monitor systems that are harder to understand and to exercise their skills only intermittently. In the US, the FAA’s Automated En-route ATC programme is designed to detect potential conflicts up to 20 minutes before they occur. It generates a resolution immediately, and provides simulation capabilities.As a result, the controller deals only with aircraft that the system says need attention, and while he/she has to rely on the system to detect problems and provide resolutions. The controller resolves them as soon as they are detected rather than wait to assess them visually on the situation display, so the focus of attention shifts from tactical monitoring, problem analysis and coordination toward strategic planning tasks.Many French controllers query this philosophy. Applied to French airspace, it could, mean a controller has to transmit a revised clearance to an aircraft in his sector to avoid a predicted conflict in another sector with an aircraft currently in a third. And if he disagrees with the clearance, he will have to propose an alternative without having access to information on what is happening in the other two sectors. If the controller’s role is limited to transmitting machine-generated clearances, he will soon lose his ability to make control decisions. CENA is developing an alternative at its Toulouse training centre. The En-Route Air Traffic Organizer (ERATO) is a software program to cope with what CENA terms the capacity barrier. It takes all the information available from sensors and flight plans, plus intention data obtained by data link from aircraft to create a working airspace model. The scenario it presents can identify and prioritize potential conflicts, and offer tool to resolve them. To do this, ERATO enlists the support of artificial intelligence techniques. It can describe the mental activity of controller, and assess deterioration under pressure of time, fatigue and stress. The central question is to identify the conditions under which the controller’s knowledge ceases to be accessible. It also sets out to identify and predict sources of error.1. Partial automation can actually increase the risk of error attributable to human operators because （ ） ．
