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Crowded skies make the controller＇s work more arduous. The UK National Air Traffic Services (NATS) has come up with a solution to lighten the load and handle some of the mundane tasks. Operational Trials with a new Short-term conflict Alert (STCA) system have just started at the Manchester Area Control Center and will soon start at the London Central Control Function. The new short-term conflict alert warns controllers by visual and / or audible signs that aircraft are in danger of collision. For the first time, the system has been adapted for terminal use, and can be modeled to the complex skies around an airport such as London Heathrow. A new NATS Operational Display Equipment (NODE) system is under opera tional evaluation at the Manchester Centre and planned for the London Area Central Control Function, New En-Route Centre, and Scottish Centre. It can define regions of airspace and can vary the parameters according to airspace type – en-route, TMA, advisory, ap proach, departure or stack and apply separation standards. The NODE STCA software applies three filters to multi-radar track data and Mode C al titude inputs in order to identify pairs of aircraft that are in conflict or could come into con flict within two minutes. A linear prediction filter extrapolates recent tracks forward laterally and vertically. A current proximity filter measures actual lateral and vertical separations to detect aircraft deviating suddenly from an acceptable separation. A maneuver hazard filter examines the position of all turning aircraft at similar altitudes, assuming a 3deg/sec turn rate. To minimize unnecessary alerts caused by such factors as Mode C errors or aircraft leveling off or turning away from conflicts, at least one filter must be passed at least twice to generate an alert. Unless there is an imminent danger of collision the alert is held back until the latest time that an instruction to take avoiding action could be issued and acted on. At that point the labels of conflicting aircraft on the controller’s screen start to flash bright/dim, a dotted line links the targets involved, and the label information is displayed in a con flict alert box. The system distinguishes between low-intensity and high intensity alerts—including all current proximity and maneuver hazard alerts, which are designated by an asterisk and can not be acknowledged. The NODE-M STCA algorithm has also been designed to anticipate Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) alerts in 90 percent of cases. One source of unnecessary alerts is aircraft transitioning to a cleared flight level which is one level away from another aircraft NODE STCA does not take account of controller-input cleared fight levels, since that would lead to failure to detect potential conflicts when aircraft bust their cleared level. However, intention data from aircraft flight management systems is expected to be available in the future via Mode S data link, and research by the UK Defense Research Agency (DRA) suggests this could virtually eliminate level-off alerts.4. According to the passage, might result in unnecessary alerts.
Crowded skies make the controller＇s work more arduous. The UK National Air Traffic Services (NATS) has come up with a solution to lighten the load and handle some of the mundane tasks. Operational Trials with a new Short-term conflict Alert (STCA) system have just started at the Manchester Area Control Center and will soon start at the London Central Control Function. The new short-term conflict alert warns controllers by visual and / or audible signs that aircraft are in danger of collision. For the first time, the system has been adapted for terminal use, and can be modeled to the complex skies around an airport such as London Heathrow. A new NATS Operational Display Equipment (NODE) system is under opera tional evaluation at the Manchester Centre and planned for the London Area Central Control Function, New En-Route Centre, and Scottish Centre. It can define regions of airspace and can vary the parameters according to airspace type – en-route, TMA, advisory, ap proach, departure or stack and apply separation standards. The NODE STCA software applies three filters to multi-radar track data and Mode C al titude inputs in order to identify pairs of aircraft that are in conflict or could come into con flict within two minutes. A linear prediction filter extrapolates recent tracks forward laterally and vertically. A current proximity filter measures actual lateral and vertical separations to detect aircraft deviating suddenly from an acceptable separation. A maneuver hazard filter examines the position of all turning aircraft at similar altitudes, assuming a 3deg/sec turn rate. To minimize unnecessary alerts caused by such factors as Mode C errors or aircraft leveling off or turning away from conflicts, at least one filter must be passed at least twice to generate an alert. Unless there is an imminent danger of collision the alert is held back until the latest time that an instruction to take avoiding action could be issued and acted on. At that point the labels of conflicting aircraft on the controller’s screen start to flash bright/dim, a dotted line links the targets involved, and the label information is displayed in a con flict alert box. The system distinguishes between low-intensity and high intensity alerts—including all current proximity and maneuver hazard alerts, which are designated by an asterisk and can not be acknowledged. The NODE-M STCA algorithm has also been designed to anticipate Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) alerts in 90 percent of cases. One source of unnecessary alerts is aircraft transitioning to a cleared flight level which is one level away from another aircraft NODE STCA does not take account of controller-input cleared fight levels, since that would lead to failure to detect potential conflicts when aircraft bust their cleared level. However, intention data from aircraft flight management systems is expected to be available in the future via Mode S data link, and research by the UK Defense Research Agency (DRA) suggests this could virtually eliminate level-off alerts.3.will detect aircraft deviating suddenly from an acceptable separation.
Crowded skies make the controller＇s work more arduous. The UK National Air Traffic Services (NATS) has come up with a solution to lighten the load and handle some of the mundane tasks. Operational Trials with a new Short-term conflict Alert (STCA) system have just started at the Manchester Area Control Center and will soon start at the London Central Control Function. The new short-term conflict alert warns controllers by visual and / or audible signs that aircraft are in danger of collision. For the first time, the system has been adapted for terminal use, and can be modeled to the complex skies around an airport such as London Heathrow. A new NATS Operational Display Equipment (NODE) system is under opera tional evaluation at the Manchester Centre and planned for the London Area Central Control Function, New En-Route Centre, and Scottish Centre. It can define regions of airspace and can vary the parameters according to airspace type – en-route, TMA, advisory, ap proach, departure or stack and apply separation standards. The NODE STCA software applies three filters to multi-radar track data and Mode C al titude inputs in order to identify pairs of aircraft that are in conflict or could come into con flict within two minutes. A linear prediction filter extrapolates recent tracks forward laterally and vertically. A current proximity filter measures actual lateral and vertical separations to detect aircraft deviating suddenly from an acceptable separation. A maneuver hazard filter examines the position of all turning aircraft at similar altitudes, assuming a 3deg/sec turn rate. To minimize unnecessary alerts caused by such factors as Mode C errors or aircraft leveling off or turning away from conflicts, at least one filter must be passed at least twice to generate an alert. Unless there is an imminent danger of collision the alert is held back until the latest time that an instruction to take avoiding action could be issued and acted on. At that point the labels of conflicting aircraft on the controller’s screen start to flash bright/dim, a dotted line links the targets involved, and the label information is displayed in a con flict alert box. The system distinguishes between low-intensity and high intensity alerts—including all current proximity and maneuver hazard alerts, which are designated by an asterisk and can not be acknowledged. The NODE-M STCA algorithm has also been designed to anticipate Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) alerts in 90 percent of cases. One source of unnecessary alerts is aircraft transitioning to a cleared flight level which is one level away from another aircraft NODE STCA does not take account of controller-input cleared fight levels, since that would lead to failure to detect potential conflicts when aircraft bust their cleared level. However, intention data from aircraft flight management systems is expected to be available in the future via Mode S data link, and research by the UK Defense Research Agency (DRA) suggests this could virtually eliminate level-off alerts.2. In regard to NODE system, which of the following isn＇t true?
Crowded skies make the controller＇s work more arduous. The UK National Air Traffic Services (NATS) has come up with a solution to lighten the load and handle some of the mundane tasks. Operational Trials with a new Short-term conflict Alert (STCA) system have just started at the Manchester Area Control Center and will soon start at the London Central Control Function. The new short-term conflict alert warns controllers by visual and / or audible signs that aircraft are in danger of collision. For the first time, the system has been adapted for terminal use, and can be modeled to the complex skies around an airport such as London Heathrow. A new NATS Operational Display Equipment (NODE) system is under opera tional evaluation at the Manchester Centre and planned for the London Area Central Control Function, New En-Route Centre, and Scottish Centre. It can define regions of airspace and can vary the parameters according to airspace type – en-route, TMA, advisory, ap proach, departure or stack and apply separation standards. The NODE STCA software applies three filters to multi-radar track data and Mode C al titude inputs in order to identify pairs of aircraft that are in conflict or could come into con flict within two minutes. A linear prediction filter extrapolates recent tracks forward laterally and vertically. A current proximity filter measures actual lateral and vertical separations to detect aircraft deviating suddenly from an acceptable separation. A maneuver hazard filter examines the position of all turning aircraft at similar altitudes, assuming a 3deg/sec turn rate. To minimize unnecessary alerts caused by such factors as Mode C errors or aircraft leveling off or turning away from conflicts, at least one filter must be passed at least twice to generate an alert. Unless there is an imminent danger of collision the alert is held back until the latest time that an instruction to take avoiding action could be issued and acted on. At that point the labels of conflicting aircraft on the controller’s screen start to flash bright/dim, a dotted line links the targets involved, and the label information is displayed in a con flict alert box. The system distinguishes between low-intensity and high intensity alerts—including all current proximity and maneuver hazard alerts, which are designated by an asterisk and can not be acknowledged. The NODE-M STCA algorithm has also been designed to anticipate Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) alerts in 90 percent of cases. One source of unnecessary alerts is aircraft transitioning to a cleared flight level which is one level away from another aircraft NODE STCA does not take account of controller-input cleared fight levels, since that would lead to failure to detect potential conflicts when aircraft bust their cleared level. However, intention data from aircraft flight management systems is expected to be available in the future via Mode S data link, and research by the UK Defense Research Agency (DRA) suggests this could virtually eliminate level-off alerts.1.will soon start at the London Central Control Function.
After boarding the passenger, we ramped out and I ordered the F/O to set flap 5. While I was confirming, ATC gave us information concerning a thunderstorm 5 miles south of airport and I missed checking the Flap setting. After lining up the aircraft for a standing takeoff, I pressed the TOGA switch and as soon as the throttle advanced forward, the Takeoff warning was activated simultaneously, so we rejected the takeoff. After applying immediate action, the rolling distance was only 1~2 m and brake temperature was in normal range. So I set the flap at the appropriate position and proceeded with the normal operation. Reports on Rejected takeoff due to missed flap setting are occasionally reported. Most of the time this happens when multiple situations occur while crew are in the middle of performing normal procedure during a short taxiway to the runway, which affects the normal takeoff. Therefore whenever the situation is busy, complex, or the taxiway to the runway is short, the pilot should stay composed and try to ensure there is enough time for normal procedures.5. What was the main idea of the passage?
After boarding the passenger, we ramped out and I ordered the F/O to set flap 5. While I was confirming, ATC gave us information concerning a thunderstorm 5 miles south of airport and I missed checking the Flap setting. After lining up the aircraft for a standing takeoff, I pressed the TOGA switch and as soon as the throttle advanced forward, the Takeoff warning was activated simultaneously, so we rejected the takeoff. After applying immediate action, the rolling distance was only 1~2 m and brake temperature was in normal range. So I set the flap at the appropriate position and proceeded with the normal operation. Reports on Rejected takeoff due to missed flap setting are occasionally reported. Most of the time this happens when multiple situations occur while crew are in the middle of performing normal procedure during a short taxiway to the runway, which affects the normal takeoff. Therefore whenever the situation is busy, complex, or the taxiway to the runway is short, the pilot should stay composed and try to ensure there is enough time for normal procedures.4. What should a pilot do in a complex situation according to the passage?
After boarding the passenger, we ramped out and I ordered the F/O to set flap 5. While I was confirming, ATC gave us information concerning a thunderstorm 5 miles south of airport and I missed checking the Flap setting. After lining up the aircraft for a standing takeoff, I pressed the TOGA switch and as soon as the throttle advanced forward, the Takeoff warning was activated simultaneously, so we rejected the takeoff. After applying immediate action, the rolling distance was only 1~2 m and brake temperature was in normal range. So I set the flap at the appropriate position and proceeded with the normal operation. Reports on Rejected takeoff due to missed flap setting are occasionally reported. Most of the time this happens when multiple situations occur while crew are in the middle of performing normal procedure during a short taxiway to the runway, which affects the normal takeoff. Therefore whenever the situation is busy, complex, or the taxiway to the runway is short, the pilot should stay composed and try to ensure there is enough time for normal procedures.3. Why was the brake temperature in normal range?
After boarding the passenger, we ramped out and I ordered the F/O to set flap 5. While I was confirming, ATC gave us information concerning a thunderstorm 5 miles south of airport and I missed checking the Flap setting. After lining up the aircraft for a standing takeoff, I pressed the TOGA switch and as soon as the throttle advanced forward, the Takeoff warning was activated simultaneously, so we rejected the takeoff. After applying immediate action, the rolling distance was only 1~2 m and brake temperature was in normal range. So I set the flap at the appropriate position and proceeded with the normal operation. Reports on Rejected takeoff due to missed flap setting are occasionally reported. Most of the time this happens when multiple situations occur while crew are in the middle of performing normal procedure during a short taxiway to the runway, which affects the normal takeoff. Therefore whenever the situation is busy, complex, or the taxiway to the runway is short, the pilot should stay composed and try to ensure there is enough time for normal procedures.2. Why did the captain reject takeoff?
After boarding the passenger, we ramped out and I ordered the F/O to set flap 5. While I was confirming, ATC gave us information concerning a thunderstorm 5 miles south of airport and I missed checking the Flap setting. After lining up the aircraft for a standing takeoff, I pressed the TOGA switch and as soon as the throttle advanced forward, the Takeoff warning was activated simultaneously, so we rejected the takeoff. After applying immediate action, the rolling distance was only 1~2 m and brake temperature was in normal range. So I set the flap at the appropriate position and proceeded with the normal operation. Reports on Rejected takeoff due to missed flap setting are occasionally reported. Most of the time this happens when multiple situations occur while crew are in the middle of performing normal procedure during a short taxiway to the runway, which affects the normal takeoff. Therefore whenever the situation is busy, complex, or the taxiway to the runway is short, the pilot should stay composed and try to ensure there is enough time for normal procedures.1. Why did the captain miss checking the Flap setting?
Fifteen years ago, I was asked to fly and old Queen Air from Florida to Puerto Rico for a friend. When I arrived in Florida the day before the trip I thought that I should give the old bird a short hop around the patch to check it out. I had limited experience with autopilots. A friend of mine asked to ride along, which was okay with me. As we taxied out and went through the runup, things were fine. I ignored the autopilot as always. The takeoff went well and the old bird performed as expected. We climbed out to about 5,000 ft and played with props and power settings, etc. I gave the Queen Air a good checkout, and the old bird checked out as I was told it would. So, after about an hour I headed for home port. For some reason as we were flying back I had the urge to turn the autopilot on. Which I did (first mistake). At first the autopilot worked perfectly. First a left bank, then right then I set the heading bug for dead ahead to the airport and me and my passenger settled into a little idle conversation. Yeah, right. With no warning the Queen Air nose over. I had not touched anything. So I took hold of the yoke and applied back pressure. The more I applied, the more noses - over we became. By now my passenger (who is a pilot also) was pulling on the yoke too, trying to help, to no avail. I had no idea about how the autopilot system worked. All I knew was that I was in trouble and needed to do something fast. My airspeed was climbing and I was looking at a part of Florida that I would rather be looking at out the side window. How and just why I＇ll never know, but I caught a glimpse of the trim running wild nose - down. I told my now - copilot to disconnect the autopilot as I reached for the trim to try and stop it. The autopilot was turned off but the trim was still trying to run. Not until my friend unplugged the monster and I re - trimmed by hand did we gain control of the air plane. When we finally leveled off, we were only about 500 ft above terra firma. I＇m sure I don＇t need to tell you just what had been scared out of me and my friend. The rest of trip back was uneventful. When we were back on the ground I inquired about the autopilot. Not a soul knew how it worked or anything about it，But I didn＇t give up. I found an old salt who knew autopilot systems inside and out and got a very well- need ed ground school. I learned that the pitch trim is the most powerful force an autopilot can muster and that if you pull or push the control wheel against the movements of the autopilot the trim will turn in the opposite direction. The autopilot itself can＇t overpower the weakest pilot, but if allowed to run away, the pitch trim can＇t be overcome by the strongest pilot. I was very lucky, had my friend not been with me that day I don＇t think that I would be here now. I bet there are a lot of pilots who don＇t have a clue about the real workings of autopilots, let alone how to preflight one or to identify a trim runaway. Now I make sure that I understand everything there is to know about the autopilot I am flying.5. The writer learned in and after the flight that .
