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On 20 August 2005, an A330 aircraft was being operated on a scheduled passenger service from Narita International Airport, Japan, to Perth International Airport, Western Australia. The aircraft departed Narita at about 12:38 Coordinated Universal Time, with 13 crew and 181 passengers on board. At 14:05, while the aircraft was in cruise, the crew received an Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring (ECAM) warning indicating that there was smoke in the forward cargo hold. The crew activated the fire extinguishing system, and diverted the aircraft to Kansai International Airport, Japan. At 15:51, immediately after the aircraft had landed, emergency services personnel reported that there appeared to be smoke in the vicinity of the nose landing gear. The flight crew initiated an emergency evacuation of the aircraft. During the evacuation, one passenger sustained serious injuries and eight passengers sustained minor injuries.4. After landing, emergency service personnel reported that there appeared to be smoke .
On 20 August 2005, an A330 aircraft was being operated on a scheduled passenger service from Narita International Airport, Japan, to Perth International Airport, Western Australia. The aircraft departed Narita at about 12:38 Coordinated Universal Time, with 13 crew and 181 passengers on board. At 14:05, while the aircraft was in cruise, the crew received an Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring (ECAM) warning indicating that there was smoke in the forward cargo hold. The crew activated the fire extinguishing system, and diverted the aircraft to Kansai International Airport, Japan. At 15:51, immediately after the aircraft had landed, emergency services personnel reported that there appeared to be smoke in the vicinity of the nose landing gear. The flight crew initiated an emergency evacuation of the aircraft. During the evacuation, one passenger sustained serious injuries and eight passengers sustained minor injuries.3. What actions did the crew take?
On 20 August 2005, an A330 aircraft was being operated on a scheduled passenger service from Narita International Airport, Japan, to Perth International Airport, Western Australia. The aircraft departed Narita at about 12:38 Coordinated Universal Time, with 13 crew and 181 passengers on board. At 14:05, while the aircraft was in cruise, the crew received an Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring (ECAM) warning indicating that there was smoke in the forward cargo hold. The crew activated the fire extinguishing system, and diverted the aircraft to Kansai International Airport, Japan. At 15:51, immediately after the aircraft had landed, emergency services personnel reported that there appeared to be smoke in the vicinity of the nose landing gear. The flight crew initiated an emergency evacuation of the aircraft. During the evacuation, one passenger sustained serious injuries and eight passengers sustained minor injuries.2. The crew received an Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring warning indicating that （ ）.
On 20 August 2005, an A330 aircraft was being operated on a scheduled passenger service from Narita International Airport, Japan, to Perth International Airport, Western Australia. The aircraft departed Narita at about 12:38 Coordinated Universal Time, with 13 crew and 181 passengers on board. At 14:05, while the aircraft was in cruise, the crew received an Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring (ECAM) warning indicating that there was smoke in the forward cargo hold. The crew activated the fire extinguishing system, and diverted the aircraft to Kansai International Airport, Japan. At 15:51, immediately after the aircraft had landed, emergency services personnel reported that there appeared to be smoke in the vicinity of the nose landing gear. The flight crew initiated an emergency evacuation of the aircraft. During the evacuation, one passenger sustained serious injuries and eight passengers sustained minor injuries.1. How many persons are there on board the aircraft?
Ground ice has been a contributing factor in many aircraft accidents over the past 25 years. Even small amount of fronts snow, ice, or freezing rain on critical surfaces can create serious flight problems. These include an increase in stall speed, altered flight characteris tics, reduced controllability, incorrect instrument readings, and damage to engines if ice is ingested after it sheds. Even though your aircraft may be certified to fly in known icing conditions, it is not certified for takeoff with ice adhering to the airframe. Any accumulated ice must be removed and the aircraft kept in a clean condition up to and during the takeoff roll. The ultimate responsibility for determining that an aircraft is clean and meets airworthiness requirements rests with the pilot-in-command. If you are one, be aware that at times you may not be able to determine whether your aircraft’s critical control surfaces are free of these contaminants, but you will be held accountable anyway. So, becoming thoroughly familiar with what Type I and Type II fluids can and cannot do for you is very important. FAA’s new documented deicing program requires Part 121 airlines to have training pro grams for employees who apply fluids, to identify which personnel are responsible for what, and to establish standards for implementing the procedures. FAA’s program also requires a statement of what information will be transmitted to the cockpit about what fluid type/concentrations were applied and when it was done. This allows the pilot-in-command to have the necessary information to make a takeoff decision and to be responsible. Ground ice contamination is a result of various forms of precipitation, as well as frost. Snow and freezing fog, drizzle and rain are the precipitation types responsible for ground ic ing. A variety of frost exists meteorologically, but from an aviation standpoint, only two - some and none - are important, and some is too much.5. The best title for the passage is .
Ground ice has been a contributing factor in many aircraft accidents over the past 25 years. Even small amount of fronts snow, ice, or freezing rain on critical surfaces can create serious flight problems. These include an increase in stall speed, altered flight characteris tics, reduced controllability, incorrect instrument readings, and damage to engines if ice is ingested after it sheds. Even though your aircraft may be certified to fly in known icing conditions, it is not certified for takeoff with ice adhering to the airframe. Any accumulated ice must be removed and the aircraft kept in a clean condition up to and during the takeoff roll. The ultimate responsibility for determining that an aircraft is clean and meets airworthiness requirements rests with the pilot-in-command. If you are one, be aware that at times you may not be able to determine whether your aircraft’s critical control surfaces are free of these contaminants, but you will be held accountable anyway. So, becoming thoroughly familiar with what Type I and Type II fluids can and cannot do for you is very important. FAA’s new documented deicing program requires Part 121 airlines to have training pro grams for employees who apply fluids, to identify which personnel are responsible for what, and to establish standards for implementing the procedures. FAA’s program also requires a statement of what information will be transmitted to the cockpit about what fluid type/concentrations were applied and when it was done. This allows the pilot-in-command to have the necessary information to make a takeoff decision and to be responsible. Ground ice contamination is a result of various forms of precipitation, as well as frost. Snow and freezing fog, drizzle and rain are the precipitation types responsible for ground ic ing. A variety of frost exists meteorologically, but from an aviation standpoint, only two - some and none - are important, and some is too much.4. Which of the following differs from the other three?
Ground ice has been a contributing factor in many aircraft accidents over the past 25 years. Even small amount of fronts snow, ice, or freezing rain on critical surfaces can create serious flight problems. These include an increase in stall speed, altered flight characteris tics, reduced controllability, incorrect instrument readings, and damage to engines if ice is ingested after it sheds. Even though your aircraft may be certified to fly in known icing conditions, it is not certified for takeoff with ice adhering to the airframe. Any accumulated ice must be removed and the aircraft kept in a clean condition up to and during the takeoff roll. The ultimate responsibility for determining that an aircraft is clean and meets airworthiness requirements rests with the pilot-in-command. If you are one, be aware that at times you may not be able to determine whether your aircraft’s critical control surfaces are free of these contaminants, but you will be held accountable anyway. So, becoming thoroughly familiar with what Type I and Type II fluids can and cannot do for you is very important. FAA’s new documented deicing program requires Part 121 airlines to have training pro grams for employees who apply fluids, to identify which personnel are responsible for what, and to establish standards for implementing the procedures. FAA’s program also requires a statement of what information will be transmitted to the cockpit about what fluid type/concentrations were applied and when it was done. This allows the pilot-in-command to have the necessary information to make a takeoff decision and to be responsible. Ground ice contamination is a result of various forms of precipitation, as well as frost. Snow and freezing fog, drizzle and rain are the precipitation types responsible for ground ic ing. A variety of frost exists meteorologically, but from an aviation standpoint, only two - some and none - are important, and some is too much.3. The pilot in command should be thoroughly familiar with Type I and Type II fluids because .
Ground ice has been a contributing factor in many aircraft accidents over the past 25 years. Even small amount of fronts snow, ice, or freezing rain on critical surfaces can create serious flight problems. These include an increase in stall speed, altered flight characteris tics, reduced controllability, incorrect instrument readings, and damage to engines if ice is ingested after it sheds. Even though your aircraft may be certified to fly in known icing conditions, it is not certified for takeoff with ice adhering to the airframe. Any accumulated ice must be removed and the aircraft kept in a clean condition up to and during the takeoff roll. The ultimate responsibility for determining that an aircraft is clean and meets airworthiness requirements rests with the pilot-in-command. If you are one, be aware that at times you may not be able to determine whether your aircraft’s critical control surfaces are free of these contaminants, but you will be held accountable anyway. So, becoming thoroughly familiar with what Type I and Type II fluids can and cannot do for you is very important. FAA’s new documented deicing program requires Part 121 airlines to have training pro grams for employees who apply fluids, to identify which personnel are responsible for what, and to establish standards for implementing the procedures. FAA’s program also requires a statement of what information will be transmitted to the cockpit about what fluid type/concentrations were applied and when it was done. This allows the pilot-in-command to have the necessary information to make a takeoff decision and to be responsible. Ground ice contamination is a result of various forms of precipitation, as well as frost. Snow and freezing fog, drizzle and rain are the precipitation types responsible for ground ic ing. A variety of frost exists meteorologically, but from an aviation standpoint, only two - some and none - are important, and some is too much.2. The aircraft must be kept in clean condition up to and during the takeoff roll because .
Ground ice has been a contributing factor in many aircraft accidents over the past 25 years. Even small amount of fronts snow, ice, or freezing rain on critical surfaces can create serious flight problems. These include an increase in stall speed, altered flight characteris tics, reduced controllability, incorrect instrument readings, and damage to engines if ice is ingested after it sheds. Even though your aircraft may be certified to fly in known icing conditions, it is not certified for takeoff with ice adhering to the airframe. Any accumulated ice must be removed and the aircraft kept in a clean condition up to and during the takeoff roll. The ultimate responsibility for determining that an aircraft is clean and meets airworthiness requirements rests with the pilot-in-command. If you are one, be aware that at times you may not be able to determine whether your aircraft’s critical control surfaces are free of these contaminants, but you will be held accountable anyway. So, becoming thoroughly familiar with what Type I and Type II fluids can and cannot do for you is very important. FAA’s new documented deicing program requires Part 121 airlines to have training pro grams for employees who apply fluids, to identify which personnel are responsible for what, and to establish standards for implementing the procedures. FAA’s program also requires a statement of what information will be transmitted to the cockpit about what fluid type/concentrations were applied and when it was done. This allows the pilot-in-command to have the necessary information to make a takeoff decision and to be responsible. Ground ice contamination is a result of various forms of precipitation, as well as frost. Snow and freezing fog, drizzle and rain are the precipitation types responsible for ground ic ing. A variety of frost exists meteorologically, but from an aviation standpoint, only two - some and none - are important, and some is too much.1. Ground ice takes the form of .
Crowded skies make the controller＇s work more arduous. The UK National Air Traffic Services (NATS) has come up with a solution to lighten the load and handle some of the mundane tasks. Operational Trials with a new Short-term conflict Alert (STCA) system have just started at the Manchester Area Control Center and will soon start at the London Central Control Function. The new short-term conflict alert warns controllers by visual and / or audible signs that aircraft are in danger of collision. For the first time, the system has been adapted for terminal use, and can be modeled to the complex skies around an airport such as London Heathrow. A new NATS Operational Display Equipment (NODE) system is under opera tional evaluation at the Manchester Centre and planned for the London Area Central Control Function, New En-Route Centre, and Scottish Centre. It can define regions of airspace and can vary the parameters according to airspace type – en-route, TMA, advisory, ap proach, departure or stack and apply separation standards. The NODE STCA software applies three filters to multi-radar track data and Mode C al titude inputs in order to identify pairs of aircraft that are in conflict or could come into con flict within two minutes. A linear prediction filter extrapolates recent tracks forward laterally and vertically. A current proximity filter measures actual lateral and vertical separations to detect aircraft deviating suddenly from an acceptable separation. A maneuver hazard filter examines the position of all turning aircraft at similar altitudes, assuming a 3deg/sec turn rate. To minimize unnecessary alerts caused by such factors as Mode C errors or aircraft leveling off or turning away from conflicts, at least one filter must be passed at least twice to generate an alert. Unless there is an imminent danger of collision the alert is held back until the latest time that an instruction to take avoiding action could be issued and acted on. At that point the labels of conflicting aircraft on the controller’s screen start to flash bright/dim, a dotted line links the targets involved, and the label information is displayed in a con flict alert box. The system distinguishes between low-intensity and high intensity alerts—including all current proximity and maneuver hazard alerts, which are designated by an asterisk and can not be acknowledged. The NODE-M STCA algorithm has also been designed to anticipate Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) alerts in 90 percent of cases. One source of unnecessary alerts is aircraft transitioning to a cleared flight level which is one level away from another aircraft NODE STCA does not take account of controller-input cleared fight levels, since that would lead to failure to detect potential conflicts when aircraft bust their cleared level. However, intention data from aircraft flight management systems is expected to be available in the future via Mode S data link, and research by the UK Defense Research Agency (DRA) suggests this could virtually eliminate level-off alerts.5. From the passage, what inference can we make?
