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As with aerodrome control and approach control, so with area control, coordination is the vital function which links all of these services. Aircraft which are receiving an air traffic control service or an advisory service from an air traffic control center (ATCC) or from a sector within that ATCC, must not be permitted to penetrate the airspace of another ATCC or sector unless prior coordination has taken place. In all coordination it is important to recognize that they must take place ahead of the concerned aircraft＇s movement, and that the responsibility for initiating this action rests with the controller of the unit or sector which is transferring control. It is further a requirement of coordination that the transferring controller must comply with any conditions specified by the accepting controller. For example, the accepting controller may require the aircraft to go to a higher or lower level or require the aircraft to be delayed, due to traffic in his sector. The reason, quite simply, is to ensure that no aircraft is transferred from one controlling authority to another until the airspace is clear to receive it, in accordance with the standards of separation previously described. The steps in coordination, which take place progressively, can be described as notification, negotiation and agreement. How this process is achieved is the subject of local agreement between the units concerned, often including neighboring foreign states. There are, of course, occa sions where it is not necessary to coordinate each individual movement, but these instances are subject to detailed operating procedures, agreed to and implemented by both parties. In regard to coordination with aerodrome control and approach control, the role of area control is that of a parent body, whose task is to ensure the overall efficiency and safe operation of the air traffic services. Approach control and aerodrome control units are required to comply with instructions which area control issues to achieve the objective of the air traffic control service, throughout the specific airspace for which they are responsible. For exam ple, when it is necessary to coordinate the departures from one or more aerodromes, the time at which individual aircraft can take off is specified by area control. Similarly, with traffic which is inbound to aerodromes, it is area control who issues the ATC clearance to the air craft, either to proceed to a holding facility serving the aerodrome or, if the arrival flow into a particular aerodrome permits, clear the aircraft to make R/T contact direct with approach control.2. is responsible for initiating coordination.
As with aerodrome control and approach control, so with area control, coordination is the vital function which links all of these services. Aircraft which are receiving an air traffic control service or an advisory service from an air traffic control center (ATCC) or from a sector within that ATCC, must not be permitted to penetrate the airspace of another ATCC or sector unless prior coordination has taken place. In all coordination it is important to recognize that they must take place ahead of the concerned aircraft＇s movement, and that the responsibility for initiating this action rests with the controller of the unit or sector which is transferring control. It is further a requirement of coordination that the transferring controller must comply with any conditions specified by the accepting controller. For example, the accepting controller may require the aircraft to go to a higher or lower level or require the aircraft to be delayed, due to traffic in his sector. The reason, quite simply, is to ensure that no aircraft is transferred from one controlling authority to another until the airspace is clear to receive it, in accordance with the standards of separation previously described. The steps in coordination, which take place progressively, can be described as notification, negotiation and agreement. How this process is achieved is the subject of local agreement between the units concerned, often including neighboring foreign states. There are, of course, occa sions where it is not necessary to coordinate each individual movement, but these instances are subject to detailed operating procedures, agreed to and implemented by both parties. In regard to coordination with aerodrome control and approach control, the role of area control is that of a parent body, whose task is to ensure the overall efficiency and safe operation of the air traffic services. Approach control and aerodrome control units are required to comply with instructions which area control issues to achieve the objective of the air traffic control service, throughout the specific airspace for which they are responsible. For exam ple, when it is necessary to coordinate the departures from one or more aerodromes, the time at which individual aircraft can take off is specified by area control. Similarly, with traffic which is inbound to aerodromes, it is area control who issues the ATC clearance to the air craft, either to proceed to a holding facility serving the aerodrome or, if the arrival flow into a particular aerodrome permits, clear the aircraft to make R/T contact direct with approach control.1. Coordination is very important in ATC because .
On 20 August 2005, an A330 aircraft was being operated on a scheduled passenger service from Narita International Airport, Japan, to Perth International Airport, Western Australia. The aircraft departed Narita at about 12:38 Coordinated Universal Time, with 13 crew and 181 passengers on board. At 14:05, while the aircraft was in cruise, the crew received an Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring (ECAM) warning indicating that there was smoke in the forward cargo hold. The crew activated the fire extinguishing system, and diverted the aircraft to Kansai International Airport, Japan. At 15:51, immediately after the aircraft had landed, emergency services personnel reported that there appeared to be smoke in the vicinity of the nose landing gear. The flight crew initiated an emergency evacuation of the aircraft. During the evacuation, one passenger sustained serious injuries and eight passengers sustained minor injuries.5. During the evacuation, how many passengers on board were injured?
On 20 August 2005, an A330 aircraft was being operated on a scheduled passenger service from Narita International Airport, Japan, to Perth International Airport, Western Australia. The aircraft departed Narita at about 12:38 Coordinated Universal Time, with 13 crew and 181 passengers on board. At 14:05, while the aircraft was in cruise, the crew received an Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring (ECAM) warning indicating that there was smoke in the forward cargo hold. The crew activated the fire extinguishing system, and diverted the aircraft to Kansai International Airport, Japan. At 15:51, immediately after the aircraft had landed, emergency services personnel reported that there appeared to be smoke in the vicinity of the nose landing gear. The flight crew initiated an emergency evacuation of the aircraft. During the evacuation, one passenger sustained serious injuries and eight passengers sustained minor injuries.4. After landing, emergency service personnel reported that there appeared to be smoke .
On 20 August 2005, an A330 aircraft was being operated on a scheduled passenger service from Narita International Airport, Japan, to Perth International Airport, Western Australia. The aircraft departed Narita at about 12:38 Coordinated Universal Time, with 13 crew and 181 passengers on board. At 14:05, while the aircraft was in cruise, the crew received an Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring (ECAM) warning indicating that there was smoke in the forward cargo hold. The crew activated the fire extinguishing system, and diverted the aircraft to Kansai International Airport, Japan. At 15:51, immediately after the aircraft had landed, emergency services personnel reported that there appeared to be smoke in the vicinity of the nose landing gear. The flight crew initiated an emergency evacuation of the aircraft. During the evacuation, one passenger sustained serious injuries and eight passengers sustained minor injuries.3. What actions did the crew take?
On 20 August 2005, an A330 aircraft was being operated on a scheduled passenger service from Narita International Airport, Japan, to Perth International Airport, Western Australia. The aircraft departed Narita at about 12:38 Coordinated Universal Time, with 13 crew and 181 passengers on board. At 14:05, while the aircraft was in cruise, the crew received an Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring (ECAM) warning indicating that there was smoke in the forward cargo hold. The crew activated the fire extinguishing system, and diverted the aircraft to Kansai International Airport, Japan. At 15:51, immediately after the aircraft had landed, emergency services personnel reported that there appeared to be smoke in the vicinity of the nose landing gear. The flight crew initiated an emergency evacuation of the aircraft. During the evacuation, one passenger sustained serious injuries and eight passengers sustained minor injuries.2. The crew received an Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring warning indicating that （ ）.
On 20 August 2005, an A330 aircraft was being operated on a scheduled passenger service from Narita International Airport, Japan, to Perth International Airport, Western Australia. The aircraft departed Narita at about 12:38 Coordinated Universal Time, with 13 crew and 181 passengers on board. At 14:05, while the aircraft was in cruise, the crew received an Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring (ECAM) warning indicating that there was smoke in the forward cargo hold. The crew activated the fire extinguishing system, and diverted the aircraft to Kansai International Airport, Japan. At 15:51, immediately after the aircraft had landed, emergency services personnel reported that there appeared to be smoke in the vicinity of the nose landing gear. The flight crew initiated an emergency evacuation of the aircraft. During the evacuation, one passenger sustained serious injuries and eight passengers sustained minor injuries.1. How many persons are there on board the aircraft?
Ground ice has been a contributing factor in many aircraft accidents over the past 25 years. Even small amount of fronts snow, ice, or freezing rain on critical surfaces can create serious flight problems. These include an increase in stall speed, altered flight characteris tics, reduced controllability, incorrect instrument readings, and damage to engines if ice is ingested after it sheds. Even though your aircraft may be certified to fly in known icing conditions, it is not certified for takeoff with ice adhering to the airframe. Any accumulated ice must be removed and the aircraft kept in a clean condition up to and during the takeoff roll. The ultimate responsibility for determining that an aircraft is clean and meets airworthiness requirements rests with the pilot-in-command. If you are one, be aware that at times you may not be able to determine whether your aircraft’s critical control surfaces are free of these contaminants, but you will be held accountable anyway. So, becoming thoroughly familiar with what Type I and Type II fluids can and cannot do for you is very important. FAA’s new documented deicing program requires Part 121 airlines to have training pro grams for employees who apply fluids, to identify which personnel are responsible for what, and to establish standards for implementing the procedures. FAA’s program also requires a statement of what information will be transmitted to the cockpit about what fluid type/concentrations were applied and when it was done. This allows the pilot-in-command to have the necessary information to make a takeoff decision and to be responsible. Ground ice contamination is a result of various forms of precipitation, as well as frost. Snow and freezing fog, drizzle and rain are the precipitation types responsible for ground ic ing. A variety of frost exists meteorologically, but from an aviation standpoint, only two - some and none - are important, and some is too much.5. The best title for the passage is .
Ground ice has been a contributing factor in many aircraft accidents over the past 25 years. Even small amount of fronts snow, ice, or freezing rain on critical surfaces can create serious flight problems. These include an increase in stall speed, altered flight characteris tics, reduced controllability, incorrect instrument readings, and damage to engines if ice is ingested after it sheds. Even though your aircraft may be certified to fly in known icing conditions, it is not certified for takeoff with ice adhering to the airframe. Any accumulated ice must be removed and the aircraft kept in a clean condition up to and during the takeoff roll. The ultimate responsibility for determining that an aircraft is clean and meets airworthiness requirements rests with the pilot-in-command. If you are one, be aware that at times you may not be able to determine whether your aircraft’s critical control surfaces are free of these contaminants, but you will be held accountable anyway. So, becoming thoroughly familiar with what Type I and Type II fluids can and cannot do for you is very important. FAA’s new documented deicing program requires Part 121 airlines to have training pro grams for employees who apply fluids, to identify which personnel are responsible for what, and to establish standards for implementing the procedures. FAA’s program also requires a statement of what information will be transmitted to the cockpit about what fluid type/concentrations were applied and when it was done. This allows the pilot-in-command to have the necessary information to make a takeoff decision and to be responsible. Ground ice contamination is a result of various forms of precipitation, as well as frost. Snow and freezing fog, drizzle and rain are the precipitation types responsible for ground ic ing. A variety of frost exists meteorologically, but from an aviation standpoint, only two - some and none - are important, and some is too much.4. Which of the following differs from the other three?
Ground ice has been a contributing factor in many aircraft accidents over the past 25 years. Even small amount of fronts snow, ice, or freezing rain on critical surfaces can create serious flight problems. These include an increase in stall speed, altered flight characteris tics, reduced controllability, incorrect instrument readings, and damage to engines if ice is ingested after it sheds. Even though your aircraft may be certified to fly in known icing conditions, it is not certified for takeoff with ice adhering to the airframe. Any accumulated ice must be removed and the aircraft kept in a clean condition up to and during the takeoff roll. The ultimate responsibility for determining that an aircraft is clean and meets airworthiness requirements rests with the pilot-in-command. If you are one, be aware that at times you may not be able to determine whether your aircraft’s critical control surfaces are free of these contaminants, but you will be held accountable anyway. So, becoming thoroughly familiar with what Type I and Type II fluids can and cannot do for you is very important. FAA’s new documented deicing program requires Part 121 airlines to have training pro grams for employees who apply fluids, to identify which personnel are responsible for what, and to establish standards for implementing the procedures. FAA’s program also requires a statement of what information will be transmitted to the cockpit about what fluid type/concentrations were applied and when it was done. This allows the pilot-in-command to have the necessary information to make a takeoff decision and to be responsible. Ground ice contamination is a result of various forms of precipitation, as well as frost. Snow and freezing fog, drizzle and rain are the precipitation types responsible for ground ic ing. A variety of frost exists meteorologically, but from an aviation standpoint, only two - some and none - are important, and some is too much.3. The pilot in command should be thoroughly familiar with Type I and Type II fluids because .
