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Vnukovo Airlines flight VKO 2801 departed Vnukovo Airport at 04:44 GMT bound for Svalbard Airport Longyear. It was a chartered flight with workers and their families going to coal mining towns at Svalbard. The flight was normal until the start of the descent. Before radio contact with Longyear Information, the crew went through the detailed landing procedure for runway 10. At 09:56, the crew was cleared to start the descent. A little later, the crew received additional information consisting of runway in use 28, wind 230 degrees at 16 knots, visibility more than 10 km, rain showers, clouds: few at 1500 feet, scattered at 2000 feet and broken at 4000 feet, temp. 5 degrees C, dew point -0 degrees C and QNH 1005 hPa. (Later changed to 1006 hPa). The crew tried to request runway 10 for landing twice, but the request was not understood as such by Longyear Information due to language difficulties. When the flight was overhead the ADV beacon, at 10:15, the crew reported the position to Longyear Information and entered the base turn with a bank angle of 22 degrees. At 10:16, the aircraft came out of this turn on magnetic heading 160. During the right turn to the base turn, a malfunction occurred in the electric trimming mechanism, which was corrected by the crew. At 10:17, the crew started the turn to bring the aircraft out on the magnetic inbound course 300deg, as prescribed by the approach chart. The distance from the airport at this moment was 14 NM (25.9 km), as prescribed by the approach chart, but the lateral deviation from the outbound magnetic course 155 degrees from ADV was 2 NM (3.7 km) to the left. At 10:18, after the radio altimeter aural warning had been activated twice, the co-pilot took the controls and, after 6 seconds, turned the autopilot pitch channel off by ＇ overriding ＇ it. From then on until the impact, the flight continued in autopilot mode in the roll channel, and in manual mode in the pitch channel. The aircraft passed through the localizer centerline and when the turn had been completed, the aircraft rolled out on a magnetic heading of 290 degrees. At this time, there was a discussion within the crew as to whether or not the final turn had been made at the correct time. The discussion led to the roll out of the turn to final approach and a corrective turn to the right to magnetic heading 306 degrees. At this point, the aircraft was 14.7 NM (27.4 km) from the airport, 2.8 km to the right of the approach centerline, maintaining an altitude of 5000 feet (1520 m) and the crew increased the flap setting to 28 degrees. The airspeed was reduced to approx. 330 km/hr (180 kts). Instead of intercepting the centerline, the crew continued the flight on the right side, more or less paralleling the localizer course with minor heading changes. At 10:20 the flight made a corrective turn, resulting in a track close to 300 degrees. At this point, the lateral deviation from the approach centerline was 3.7 km to the right. During this corrective turn, the aircraft started descending. At 10:21, the crew made yet another corrective turn to the right. At 10:22:05, the aircraft started turning towards the left. The distance to the airport was 8 NM (14.8 km). On this part of the final approach, the aircraft apparently entered an area of strong turbulence created by the proximity to the mountains. The GPWS then activated 9 seconds before impact. The crew reacted to this by applying power and initiating a pitch-up. At 10:22:23, 7.7 NM (14.2 km) from the airport at an altitude of 2975 feet (907 m), the aircraft collided with the top of the mountain Operafjellet 3.7 km to the right of the approach centerline.4. was the magnetic inbound course prescribed by the approach chart.
Vnukovo Airlines flight VKO 2801 departed Vnukovo Airport at 04:44 GMT bound for Svalbard Airport Longyear. It was a chartered flight with workers and their families going to coal mining towns at Svalbard. The flight was normal until the start of the descent. Before radio contact with Longyear Information, the crew went through the detailed landing procedure for runway 10. At 09:56, the crew was cleared to start the descent. A little later, the crew received additional information consisting of runway in use 28, wind 230 degrees at 16 knots, visibility more than 10 km, rain showers, clouds: few at 1500 feet, scattered at 2000 feet and broken at 4000 feet, temp. 5 degrees C, dew point -0 degrees C and QNH 1005 hPa. (Later changed to 1006 hPa). The crew tried to request runway 10 for landing twice, but the request was not understood as such by Longyear Information due to language difficulties. When the flight was overhead the ADV beacon, at 10:15, the crew reported the position to Longyear Information and entered the base turn with a bank angle of 22 degrees. At 10:16, the aircraft came out of this turn on magnetic heading 160. During the right turn to the base turn, a malfunction occurred in the electric trimming mechanism, which was corrected by the crew. At 10:17, the crew started the turn to bring the aircraft out on the magnetic inbound course 300deg, as prescribed by the approach chart. The distance from the airport at this moment was 14 NM (25.9 km), as prescribed by the approach chart, but the lateral deviation from the outbound magnetic course 155 degrees from ADV was 2 NM (3.7 km) to the left. At 10:18, after the radio altimeter aural warning had been activated twice, the co-pilot took the controls and, after 6 seconds, turned the autopilot pitch channel off by ＇ overriding ＇ it. From then on until the impact, the flight continued in autopilot mode in the roll channel, and in manual mode in the pitch channel. The aircraft passed through the localizer centerline and when the turn had been completed, the aircraft rolled out on a magnetic heading of 290 degrees. At this time, there was a discussion within the crew as to whether or not the final turn had been made at the correct time. The discussion led to the roll out of the turn to final approach and a corrective turn to the right to magnetic heading 306 degrees. At this point, the aircraft was 14.7 NM (27.4 km) from the airport, 2.8 km to the right of the approach centerline, maintaining an altitude of 5000 feet (1520 m) and the crew increased the flap setting to 28 degrees. The airspeed was reduced to approx. 330 km/hr (180 kts). Instead of intercepting the centerline, the crew continued the flight on the right side, more or less paralleling the localizer course with minor heading changes. At 10:20 the flight made a corrective turn, resulting in a track close to 300 degrees. At this point, the lateral deviation from the approach centerline was 3.7 km to the right. During this corrective turn, the aircraft started descending. At 10:21, the crew made yet another corrective turn to the right. At 10:22:05, the aircraft started turning towards the left. The distance to the airport was 8 NM (14.8 km). On this part of the final approach, the aircraft apparently entered an area of strong turbulence created by the proximity to the mountains. The GPWS then activated 9 seconds before impact. The crew reacted to this by applying power and initiating a pitch-up. At 10:22:23, 7.7 NM (14.2 km) from the airport at an altitude of 2975 feet (907 m), the aircraft collided with the top of the mountain Operafjellet 3.7 km to the right of the approach centerline.3. A malfunction occurred with the during the right turn to base.
Vnukovo Airlines flight VKO 2801 departed Vnukovo Airport at 04:44 GMT bound for Svalbard Airport Longyear. It was a chartered flight with workers and their families going to coal mining towns at Svalbard. The flight was normal until the start of the descent. Before radio contact with Longyear Information, the crew went through the detailed landing procedure for runway 10. At 09:56, the crew was cleared to start the descent. A little later, the crew received additional information consisting of runway in use 28, wind 230 degrees at 16 knots, visibility more than 10 km, rain showers, clouds: few at 1500 feet, scattered at 2000 feet and broken at 4000 feet, temp. 5 degrees C, dew point -0 degrees C and QNH 1005 hPa. (Later changed to 1006 hPa). The crew tried to request runway 10 for landing twice, but the request was not understood as such by Longyear Information due to language difficulties. When the flight was overhead the ADV beacon, at 10:15, the crew reported the position to Longyear Information and entered the base turn with a bank angle of 22 degrees. At 10:16, the aircraft came out of this turn on magnetic heading 160. During the right turn to the base turn, a malfunction occurred in the electric trimming mechanism, which was corrected by the crew. At 10:17, the crew started the turn to bring the aircraft out on the magnetic inbound course 300deg, as prescribed by the approach chart. The distance from the airport at this moment was 14 NM (25.9 km), as prescribed by the approach chart, but the lateral deviation from the outbound magnetic course 155 degrees from ADV was 2 NM (3.7 km) to the left. At 10:18, after the radio altimeter aural warning had been activated twice, the co-pilot took the controls and, after 6 seconds, turned the autopilot pitch channel off by ＇ overriding ＇ it. From then on until the impact, the flight continued in autopilot mode in the roll channel, and in manual mode in the pitch channel. The aircraft passed through the localizer centerline and when the turn had been completed, the aircraft rolled out on a magnetic heading of 290 degrees. At this time, there was a discussion within the crew as to whether or not the final turn had been made at the correct time. The discussion led to the roll out of the turn to final approach and a corrective turn to the right to magnetic heading 306 degrees. At this point, the aircraft was 14.7 NM (27.4 km) from the airport, 2.8 km to the right of the approach centerline, maintaining an altitude of 5000 feet (1520 m) and the crew increased the flap setting to 28 degrees. The airspeed was reduced to approx. 330 km/hr (180 kts). Instead of intercepting the centerline, the crew continued the flight on the right side, more or less paralleling the localizer course with minor heading changes. At 10:20 the flight made a corrective turn, resulting in a track close to 300 degrees. At this point, the lateral deviation from the approach centerline was 3.7 km to the right. During this corrective turn, the aircraft started descending. At 10:21, the crew made yet another corrective turn to the right. At 10:22:05, the aircraft started turning towards the left. The distance to the airport was 8 NM (14.8 km). On this part of the final approach, the aircraft apparently entered an area of strong turbulence created by the proximity to the mountains. The GPWS then activated 9 seconds before impact. The crew reacted to this by applying power and initiating a pitch-up. At 10:22:23, 7.7 NM (14.2 km) from the airport at an altitude of 2975 feet (907 m), the aircraft collided with the top of the mountain Operafjellet 3.7 km to the right of the approach centerline.2. The crew wanted to land on runway 10, but was unable to get clearance due to （ ）.
Vnukovo Airlines flight VKO 2801 departed Vnukovo Airport at 04:44 GMT bound for Svalbard Airport Longyear. It was a chartered flight with workers and their families going to coal mining towns at Svalbard. The flight was normal until the start of the descent. Before radio contact with Longyear Information, the crew went through the detailed landing procedure for runway 10. At 09:56, the crew was cleared to start the descent. A little later, the crew received additional information consisting of runway in use 28, wind 230 degrees at 16 knots, visibility more than 10 km, rain showers, clouds: few at 1500 feet, scattered at 2000 feet and broken at 4000 feet, temp. 5 degrees C, dew point -0 degrees C and QNH 1005 hPa. (Later changed to 1006 hPa). The crew tried to request runway 10 for landing twice, but the request was not understood as such by Longyear Information due to language difficulties. When the flight was overhead the ADV beacon, at 10:15, the crew reported the position to Longyear Information and entered the base turn with a bank angle of 22 degrees. At 10:16, the aircraft came out of this turn on magnetic heading 160. During the right turn to the base turn, a malfunction occurred in the electric trimming mechanism, which was corrected by the crew. At 10:17, the crew started the turn to bring the aircraft out on the magnetic inbound course 300deg, as prescribed by the approach chart. The distance from the airport at this moment was 14 NM (25.9 km), as prescribed by the approach chart, but the lateral deviation from the outbound magnetic course 155 degrees from ADV was 2 NM (3.7 km) to the left. At 10:18, after the radio altimeter aural warning had been activated twice, the co-pilot took the controls and, after 6 seconds, turned the autopilot pitch channel off by ＇ overriding ＇ it. From then on until the impact, the flight continued in autopilot mode in the roll channel, and in manual mode in the pitch channel. The aircraft passed through the localizer centerline and when the turn had been completed, the aircraft rolled out on a magnetic heading of 290 degrees. At this time, there was a discussion within the crew as to whether or not the final turn had been made at the correct time. The discussion led to the roll out of the turn to final approach and a corrective turn to the right to magnetic heading 306 degrees. At this point, the aircraft was 14.7 NM (27.4 km) from the airport, 2.8 km to the right of the approach centerline, maintaining an altitude of 5000 feet (1520 m) and the crew increased the flap setting to 28 degrees. The airspeed was reduced to approx. 330 km/hr (180 kts). Instead of intercepting the centerline, the crew continued the flight on the right side, more or less paralleling the localizer course with minor heading changes. At 10:20 the flight made a corrective turn, resulting in a track close to 300 degrees. At this point, the lateral deviation from the approach centerline was 3.7 km to the right. During this corrective turn, the aircraft started descending. At 10:21, the crew made yet another corrective turn to the right. At 10:22:05, the aircraft started turning towards the left. The distance to the airport was 8 NM (14.8 km). On this part of the final approach, the aircraft apparently entered an area of strong turbulence created by the proximity to the mountains. The GPWS then activated 9 seconds before impact. The crew reacted to this by applying power and initiating a pitch-up. At 10:22:23, 7.7 NM (14.2 km) from the airport at an altitude of 2975 feet (907 m), the aircraft collided with the top of the mountain Operafjellet 3.7 km to the right of the approach centerline.1. When did the flight become problematic?
By the end of 1995，a new soft ground arresting system should reduce potential damage to aircraft overshooting the runways at the New York and New Jersey airports. The new system will be installed at the end of two or three runways at JFK international (1995/1997), one at Newark International (1998), and two at LaGuardia Airport (1996), all falling short of the 1000 ft(350m) overrun required by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). In a four-year cooperative agreement, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, owners of the region’s three major airports, has agreed to fund up to $4.5 million jointly with the FAA, to complete research, design, installation and monitoring of the concrete based foam blocks, said to bring a four-engined Boeing 747 travelling at 60mph to a full stop in under 600ft (183m). Information gathered during operation of the first block, to be in place at JFK by the end of the year, is intended to be used by the FAA for the preparation of a nationwide standard. The system, designed by ESCO (Engineering Systems Company) has already been suc cessfully tested at the FAA’s Technical Center, but requires further detailed investigation before the design can be finalized. Questions that still need to be answered revolve around the ease of snow removal, maintenance, strength and longevity, and on how to stop animals burrowing into the soft material. These will ultimately determine the composition of the arrester blocks. A full-scale test with an aircraft will be undertaken at the Technical Center in June. The precast foam blocks comprise a mixture of foaming agents bound by cementations material, producing a low density, light weight aerated block with little tensile strength, so that it is easily crushed when overrun by an aircraft, simulating the effect of being bogged down in sand. This deliberate fragility will affect not only the size of the blocks and jointing, but also transportation. For this reason, ESCO will be setting up a precasting factory at JFK for the first installation covering an area of 150 ft (45m) --the width of the runways--by 540ft (165m) in length. 5. ESCO will be setting up a pre-casting factory at JFK just because .
By the end of 1995，a new soft ground arresting system should reduce potential damage to aircraft overshooting the runways at the New York and New Jersey airports. The new system will be installed at the end of two or three runways at JFK international (1995/1997), one at Newark International (1998), and two at LaGuardia Airport (1996), all falling short of the 1000 ft(350m) overrun required by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). In a four-year cooperative agreement, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, owners of the region’s three major airports, has agreed to fund up to $4.5 million jointly with the FAA, to complete research, design, installation and monitoring of the concrete based foam blocks, said to bring a four-engined Boeing 747 travelling at 60mph to a full stop in under 600ft (183m). Information gathered during operation of the first block, to be in place at JFK by the end of the year, is intended to be used by the FAA for the preparation of a nationwide standard. The system, designed by ESCO (Engineering Systems Company) has already been suc cessfully tested at the FAA’s Technical Center, but requires further detailed investigation before the design can be finalized. Questions that still need to be answered revolve around the ease of snow removal, maintenance, strength and longevity, and on how to stop animals burrowing into the soft material. These will ultimately determine the composition of the arrester blocks. A full-scale test with an aircraft will be undertaken at the Technical Center in June. The precast foam blocks comprise a mixture of foaming agents bound by cementations material, producing a low density, light weight aerated block with little tensile strength, so that it is easily crushed when overrun by an aircraft, simulating the effect of being bogged down in sand. This deliberate fragility will affect not only the size of the blocks and jointing, but also transportation. For this reason, ESCO will be setting up a precasting factory at JFK for the first installation covering an area of 150 ft (45m) --the width of the runways--by 540ft (165m) in length. 4. will ultimately determine the composition of the arrester blocks.
By the end of 1995，a new soft ground arresting system should reduce potential damage to aircraft overshooting the runways at the New York and New Jersey airports. The new system will be installed at the end of two or three runways at JFK international (1995/1997), one at Newark International (1998), and two at LaGuardia Airport (1996), all falling short of the 1000 ft(350m) overrun required by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). In a four-year cooperative agreement, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, owners of the region’s three major airports, has agreed to fund up to $4.5 million jointly with the FAA, to complete research, design, installation and monitoring of the concrete based foam blocks, said to bring a four-engined Boeing 747 travelling at 60mph to a full stop in under 600ft (183m). Information gathered during operation of the first block, to be in place at JFK by the end of the year, is intended to be used by the FAA for the preparation of a nationwide standard. The system, designed by ESCO (Engineering Systems Company) has already been suc cessfully tested at the FAA’s Technical Center, but requires further detailed investigation before the design can be finalized. Questions that still need to be answered revolve around the ease of snow removal, maintenance, strength and longevity, and on how to stop animals burrowing into the soft material. These will ultimately determine the composition of the arrester blocks. A full-scale test with an aircraft will be undertaken at the Technical Center in June. The precast foam blocks comprise a mixture of foaming agents bound by cementations material, producing a low density, light weight aerated block with little tensile strength, so that it is easily crushed when overrun by an aircraft, simulating the effect of being bogged down in sand. This deliberate fragility will affect not only the size of the blocks and jointing, but also transportation. For this reason, ESCO will be setting up a precasting factory at JFK for the first installation covering an area of 150 ft (45m) --the width of the runways--by 540ft (165m) in length. 3. Which of the following hasn＇t funded for the development of the new system?
By the end of 1995，a new soft ground arresting system should reduce potential damage to aircraft overshooting the runways at the New York and New Jersey airports. The new system will be installed at the end of two or three runways at JFK international (1995/1997), one at Newark International (1998), and two at LaGuardia Airport (1996), all falling short of the 1000 ft(350m) overrun required by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). In a four-year cooperative agreement, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, owners of the region’s three major airports, has agreed to fund up to $4.5 million jointly with the FAA, to complete research, design, installation and monitoring of the concrete based foam blocks, said to bring a four-engined Boeing 747 travelling at 60mph to a full stop in under 600ft (183m). Information gathered during operation of the first block, to be in place at JFK by the end of the year, is intended to be used by the FAA for the preparation of a nationwide standard. The system, designed by ESCO (Engineering Systems Company) has already been suc cessfully tested at the FAA’s Technical Center, but requires further detailed investigation before the design can be finalized. Questions that still need to be answered revolve around the ease of snow removal, maintenance, strength and longevity, and on how to stop animals burrowing into the soft material. These will ultimately determine the composition of the arrester blocks. A full-scale test with an aircraft will be undertaken at the Technical Center in June. The precast foam blocks comprise a mixture of foaming agents bound by cementations material, producing a low density, light weight aerated block with little tensile strength, so that it is easily crushed when overrun by an aircraft, simulating the effect of being bogged down in sand. This deliberate fragility will affect not only the size of the blocks and jointing, but also transportation. For this reason, ESCO will be setting up a precasting factory at JFK for the first installation covering an area of 150 ft (45m) --the width of the runways--by 540ft (165m) in length. 2. By the end of 1998, at least how many airports will have installed the new system?
By the end of 1995，a new soft ground arresting system should reduce potential damage to aircraft overshooting the runways at the New York and New Jersey airports. The new system will be installed at the end of two or three runways at JFK international (1995/1997), one at Newark International (1998), and two at LaGuardia Airport (1996), all falling short of the 1000 ft(350m) overrun required by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). In a four-year cooperative agreement, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, owners of the region’s three major airports, has agreed to fund up to $4.5 million jointly with the FAA, to complete research, design, installation and monitoring of the concrete based foam blocks, said to bring a four-engined Boeing 747 travelling at 60mph to a full stop in under 600ft (183m). Information gathered during operation of the first block, to be in place at JFK by the end of the year, is intended to be used by the FAA for the preparation of a nationwide standard. The system, designed by ESCO (Engineering Systems Company) has already been suc cessfully tested at the FAA’s Technical Center, but requires further detailed investigation before the design can be finalized. Questions that still need to be answered revolve around the ease of snow removal, maintenance, strength and longevity, and on how to stop animals burrowing into the soft material. These will ultimately determine the composition of the arrester blocks. A full-scale test with an aircraft will be undertaken at the Technical Center in June. The precast foam blocks comprise a mixture of foaming agents bound by cementations material, producing a low density, light weight aerated block with little tensile strength, so that it is easily crushed when overrun by an aircraft, simulating the effect of being bogged down in sand. This deliberate fragility will affect not only the size of the blocks and jointing, but also transportation. For this reason, ESCO will be setting up a precasting factory at JFK for the first installation covering an area of 150 ft (45m) --the width of the runways--by 540ft (165m) in length. 1.The new soft ground arresting system is designed to .
Radio navigation is used by all commercial pilots, as well as by most other pilots. For this type of navigation, the pilot tunes the radio navigation equipment so as to receive a signal from a ground stationed NAVAID (navigation aid). A needle on the equipment tells the pilot when he is flying on a direct course to or from the station. It also shows when the aircraft drifts off course so that its direction can be corrected. The most common system designed for civil aircraft is called VOR (very-high frequency omni-directional radio beacon). In con junction with the VOR, airlines use another special device called DME (distance measuring equipment). This combined system is known as VOR/DME. A similar system used almost exclusively for military aircraft is called TACAN (tactical air navigation). A combined system, called VORTAC, can be used by both civil and military aircraft. Prior to the evolution of these systems (VOR, TACAN, and VORTAC) the radio compass low- frequency radio receiver in conjunction with the non-directional beacon (NDB) was the mainstay of air naviga tion. The low-frequency radio receiver allows the pilot to home on signals from the radio station. By applying certain procedural steps, the pilot is then able to navigate off of the station. These non-directional radio beacons, however, are subject to disturbances such as fading signals and interference from distant stations during night operations, which can cause the instrument to deviate drastically. There are three transoceanic navigation system commonly used by civilian air transports throughout the world:(1) Inertial Navigation Systems，(2) LORAN (long range navigation)，(3) Decca. Inertial navigation equipment is especially suitable for unaided operation during long flights over water or land areas without adequate radio stations on the ground; its functions naturally complement those of radio navigation systems. The LORAN (long range navigation) system was developed in the United States during World War II to overcome the accuracy limitations of older systems. Several LORAN sys tems cover most of the important trade routes of the world. They are used by marine naviga tors as well as air navigators. The Decca system was developed in Great Britain, also during World War II. It has since come into extensive use in many parts of the world. Decca is like LORAN in principle, the main difference being the type of signals used. Planes which use LORAN or Decca have equipment for receiving special signals, sent out continuously from transmitting stations, to indicate the plane’s exact position.5. is the most suitable title of the passage.
