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2. The ci Air China flight 129 departed Beijing at 08:37 on a scheduled flight to Pusan-Gimhae in South Korea. The en route part of the flight was uneventful. At 11:06 the second officer contacted Gimhae Approach. At that moment the airplane was 32 nm from the airport at an altitude of FL170. The approach controller cleared the flight to descend to 6000 feet. Runway 36L was in use and the crew could expect a straight-in approach. At 11:09 the controller notified the crew that the runway was changed to 18R, with winds 210 degrees at 17 kts. This meant a circling approach which none of the crew members had flown at Pusan. The captain and first officer then discussed the approach to be flown. The captain cautioned: We won＇t enlarge the traffic pattern; the mountains are all over that side. At 11:13 the flight was further cleared down to 2600 feet. Two minutes later the approach controller radioed: Air China 129, turn left heading 030 cleared for ILS DME runway 36L, then circle to runway 18 Right, report field in sight. At 11:17 they captured the ILS and were cleared further down to the circling altitude of 700 feet. The landing gear was extended and flaps set at 20 degrees. Then the controller instructed the flight to contact Gimhae Tower and to circle west. The second officer responded but did not read back the frequency change. The captain then instructed the first officer to disconnect the autopilot and turn left. From his position in the right hand seat the first officer was able to observe the runway. As the aircraft passed abeam the runway the autopilot was reengaged with heading select. At that moment the approach controller again contacted flight 129 instructing them to contact the tower. The crew was busy looking outside to see when they passed abeam the end of the runway. Simultaneously the Gimhae Tower controller contacted the flight using the emergency frequency. As they passed abeam the threshold at 11:20:02 they started timing to measure the commencement of turning to base. Eleven seconds after the call on the emergency frequency, the second officer reported to the Tower controller that they were on the circle approach. At 11:20:17 the captain took over control from the first officer and said he was going to turn base. He slowly began a widening turn, causing the first officer to urge him: turn quickly, not too late. Meanwhile the flight was cleared to land. At 11:20:32 the captain disconnected the autopilot and banked the plane to the right. Twenty-two seconds later the first officer cautioned: Pay attention to the altitude keeping, and the captain asked him to help him get a visual on the runway. Due to the limited visibility they were not able to see the runway. The first officer then advised the captain to initiate a go around, but the captain did not respond. At 11:21:15 the first officer said, Pull up! Pull up! Pitch attitude was increased to 11.4 degrees but thrust was not increased. Two seconds later the aircraft impacted a mountain, about 4.6 km from the runway.rcling altitude that Air China flight 129 had been cleared to was （ ） feet.
Air China flight 129 departed Beijing at 08:37 on a scheduled flight to Pusan-Gimhae in South Korea. The en route part of the flight was uneventful. At 11:06 the second officer contacted Gimhae Approach. At that moment the airplane was 32 nm from the airport at an altitude of FL170. The approach controller cleared the flight to descend to 6000 feet. Runway 36L was in use and the crew could expect a straight-in approach. At 11:09 the controller notified the crew that the runway was changed to 18R, with winds 210 degrees at 17 kts. This meant a circling approach which none of the crew members had flown at Pusan. The captain and first officer then discussed the approach to be flown. The captain cautioned: We won＇t enlarge the traffic pattern; the mountains are all over that side. At 11:13 the flight was further cleared down to 2600 feet. Two minutes later the approach controller radioed: Air China 129, turn left heading 030 cleared for ILS DME runway 36L, then circle to runway 18 Right, report field in sight. At 11:17 they captured the ILS and were cleared further down to the circling altitude of 700 feet. The landing gear was extended and flaps set at 20 degrees. Then the controller instructed the flight to contact Gimhae Tower and to circle west. The second officer responded but did not read back the frequency change. The captain then instructed the first officer to disconnect the autopilot and turn left. From his position in the right hand seat the first officer was able to observe the runway. As the aircraft passed abeam the runway the autopilot was reengaged with heading select. At that moment the approach controller again contacted flight 129 instructing them to contact the tower. The crew was busy looking outside to see when they passed abeam the end of the runway. Simultaneously the Gimhae Tower controller contacted the flight using the emergency frequency. As they passed abeam the threshold at 11:20:02 they started timing to measure the commencement of turning to base. Eleven seconds after the call on the emergency frequency, the second officer reported to the Tower controller that they were on the circle approach. At 11:20:17 the captain took over control from the first officer and said he was going to turn base. He slowly began a widening turn, causing the first officer to urge him: turn quickly, not too late. Meanwhile the flight was cleared to land. At 11:20:32 the captain disconnected the autopilot and banked the plane to the right. Twenty-two seconds later the first officer cautioned: Pay attention to the altitude keeping, and the captain asked him to help him get a visual on the runway. Due to the limited visibility they were not able to see the runway. The first officer then advised the captain to initiate a go around, but the captain did not respond. At 11:21:15 the first officer said, Pull up! Pull up! Pitch attitude was increased to 11.4 degrees but thrust was not increased. Two seconds later the aircraft impacted a mountain, about 4.6 km from the runway.1. What could be expected when the flight crew initially contacted Gimhae approach?
Vnukovo Airlines flight VKO 2801 departed Vnukovo Airport at 04:44 GMT bound for Svalbard Airport Longyear. It was a chartered flight with workers and their families going to coal mining towns at Svalbard. The flight was normal until the start of the descent. Before radio contact with Longyear Information, the crew went through the detailed landing procedure for runway 10. At 09:56, the crew was cleared to start the descent. A little later, the crew received additional information consisting of runway in use 28, wind 230 degrees at 16 knots, visibility more than 10 km, rain showers, clouds: few at 1500 feet, scattered at 2000 feet and broken at 4000 feet, temp. 5 degrees C, dew point -0 degrees C and QNH 1005 hPa. (Later changed to 1006 hPa). The crew tried to request runway 10 for landing twice, but the request was not understood as such by Longyear Information due to language difficulties. When the flight was overhead the ADV beacon, at 10:15, the crew reported the position to Longyear Information and entered the base turn with a bank angle of 22 degrees. At 10:16, the aircraft came out of this turn on magnetic heading 160. During the right turn to the base turn, a malfunction occurred in the electric trimming mechanism, which was corrected by the crew. At 10:17, the crew started the turn to bring the aircraft out on the magnetic inbound course 300deg, as prescribed by the approach chart. The distance from the airport at this moment was 14 NM (25.9 km), as prescribed by the approach chart, but the lateral deviation from the outbound magnetic course 155 degrees from ADV was 2 NM (3.7 km) to the left. At 10:18, after the radio altimeter aural warning had been activated twice, the co-pilot took the controls and, after 6 seconds, turned the autopilot pitch channel off by ＇ overriding ＇ it. From then on until the impact, the flight continued in autopilot mode in the roll channel, and in manual mode in the pitch channel. The aircraft passed through the localizer centerline and when the turn had been completed, the aircraft rolled out on a magnetic heading of 290 degrees. At this time, there was a discussion within the crew as to whether or not the final turn had been made at the correct time. The discussion led to the roll out of the turn to final approach and a corrective turn to the right to magnetic heading 306 degrees. At this point, the aircraft was 14.7 NM (27.4 km) from the airport, 2.8 km to the right of the approach centerline, maintaining an altitude of 5000 feet (1520 m) and the crew increased the flap setting to 28 degrees. The airspeed was reduced to approx. 330 km/hr (180 kts). Instead of intercepting the centerline, the crew continued the flight on the right side, more or less paralleling the localizer course with minor heading changes. At 10:20 the flight made a corrective turn, resulting in a track close to 300 degrees. At this point, the lateral deviation from the approach centerline was 3.7 km to the right. During this corrective turn, the aircraft started descending. At 10:21, the crew made yet another corrective turn to the right. At 10:22:05, the aircraft started turning towards the left. The distance to the airport was 8 NM (14.8 km). On this part of the final approach, the aircraft apparently entered an area of strong turbulence created by the proximity to the mountains. The GPWS then activated 9 seconds before impact. The crew reacted to this by applying power and initiating a pitch-up. At 10:22:23, 7.7 NM (14.2 km) from the airport at an altitude of 2975 feet (907 m), the aircraft collided with the top of the mountain Operafjellet 3.7 km to the right of the approach centerline.5. Which of the following factors contributes to the disaster?
Vnukovo Airlines flight VKO 2801 departed Vnukovo Airport at 04:44 GMT bound for Svalbard Airport Longyear. It was a chartered flight with workers and their families going to coal mining towns at Svalbard. The flight was normal until the start of the descent. Before radio contact with Longyear Information, the crew went through the detailed landing procedure for runway 10. At 09:56, the crew was cleared to start the descent. A little later, the crew received additional information consisting of runway in use 28, wind 230 degrees at 16 knots, visibility more than 10 km, rain showers, clouds: few at 1500 feet, scattered at 2000 feet and broken at 4000 feet, temp. 5 degrees C, dew point -0 degrees C and QNH 1005 hPa. (Later changed to 1006 hPa). The crew tried to request runway 10 for landing twice, but the request was not understood as such by Longyear Information due to language difficulties. When the flight was overhead the ADV beacon, at 10:15, the crew reported the position to Longyear Information and entered the base turn with a bank angle of 22 degrees. At 10:16, the aircraft came out of this turn on magnetic heading 160. During the right turn to the base turn, a malfunction occurred in the electric trimming mechanism, which was corrected by the crew. At 10:17, the crew started the turn to bring the aircraft out on the magnetic inbound course 300deg, as prescribed by the approach chart. The distance from the airport at this moment was 14 NM (25.9 km), as prescribed by the approach chart, but the lateral deviation from the outbound magnetic course 155 degrees from ADV was 2 NM (3.7 km) to the left. At 10:18, after the radio altimeter aural warning had been activated twice, the co-pilot took the controls and, after 6 seconds, turned the autopilot pitch channel off by ＇ overriding ＇ it. From then on until the impact, the flight continued in autopilot mode in the roll channel, and in manual mode in the pitch channel. The aircraft passed through the localizer centerline and when the turn had been completed, the aircraft rolled out on a magnetic heading of 290 degrees. At this time, there was a discussion within the crew as to whether or not the final turn had been made at the correct time. The discussion led to the roll out of the turn to final approach and a corrective turn to the right to magnetic heading 306 degrees. At this point, the aircraft was 14.7 NM (27.4 km) from the airport, 2.8 km to the right of the approach centerline, maintaining an altitude of 5000 feet (1520 m) and the crew increased the flap setting to 28 degrees. The airspeed was reduced to approx. 330 km/hr (180 kts). Instead of intercepting the centerline, the crew continued the flight on the right side, more or less paralleling the localizer course with minor heading changes. At 10:20 the flight made a corrective turn, resulting in a track close to 300 degrees. At this point, the lateral deviation from the approach centerline was 3.7 km to the right. During this corrective turn, the aircraft started descending. At 10:21, the crew made yet another corrective turn to the right. At 10:22:05, the aircraft started turning towards the left. The distance to the airport was 8 NM (14.8 km). On this part of the final approach, the aircraft apparently entered an area of strong turbulence created by the proximity to the mountains. The GPWS then activated 9 seconds before impact. The crew reacted to this by applying power and initiating a pitch-up. At 10:22:23, 7.7 NM (14.2 km) from the airport at an altitude of 2975 feet (907 m), the aircraft collided with the top of the mountain Operafjellet 3.7 km to the right of the approach centerline.4. was the magnetic inbound course prescribed by the approach chart.
Vnukovo Airlines flight VKO 2801 departed Vnukovo Airport at 04:44 GMT bound for Svalbard Airport Longyear. It was a chartered flight with workers and their families going to coal mining towns at Svalbard. The flight was normal until the start of the descent. Before radio contact with Longyear Information, the crew went through the detailed landing procedure for runway 10. At 09:56, the crew was cleared to start the descent. A little later, the crew received additional information consisting of runway in use 28, wind 230 degrees at 16 knots, visibility more than 10 km, rain showers, clouds: few at 1500 feet, scattered at 2000 feet and broken at 4000 feet, temp. 5 degrees C, dew point -0 degrees C and QNH 1005 hPa. (Later changed to 1006 hPa). The crew tried to request runway 10 for landing twice, but the request was not understood as such by Longyear Information due to language difficulties. When the flight was overhead the ADV beacon, at 10:15, the crew reported the position to Longyear Information and entered the base turn with a bank angle of 22 degrees. At 10:16, the aircraft came out of this turn on magnetic heading 160. During the right turn to the base turn, a malfunction occurred in the electric trimming mechanism, which was corrected by the crew. At 10:17, the crew started the turn to bring the aircraft out on the magnetic inbound course 300deg, as prescribed by the approach chart. The distance from the airport at this moment was 14 NM (25.9 km), as prescribed by the approach chart, but the lateral deviation from the outbound magnetic course 155 degrees from ADV was 2 NM (3.7 km) to the left. At 10:18, after the radio altimeter aural warning had been activated twice, the co-pilot took the controls and, after 6 seconds, turned the autopilot pitch channel off by ＇ overriding ＇ it. From then on until the impact, the flight continued in autopilot mode in the roll channel, and in manual mode in the pitch channel. The aircraft passed through the localizer centerline and when the turn had been completed, the aircraft rolled out on a magnetic heading of 290 degrees. At this time, there was a discussion within the crew as to whether or not the final turn had been made at the correct time. The discussion led to the roll out of the turn to final approach and a corrective turn to the right to magnetic heading 306 degrees. At this point, the aircraft was 14.7 NM (27.4 km) from the airport, 2.8 km to the right of the approach centerline, maintaining an altitude of 5000 feet (1520 m) and the crew increased the flap setting to 28 degrees. The airspeed was reduced to approx. 330 km/hr (180 kts). Instead of intercepting the centerline, the crew continued the flight on the right side, more or less paralleling the localizer course with minor heading changes. At 10:20 the flight made a corrective turn, resulting in a track close to 300 degrees. At this point, the lateral deviation from the approach centerline was 3.7 km to the right. During this corrective turn, the aircraft started descending. At 10:21, the crew made yet another corrective turn to the right. At 10:22:05, the aircraft started turning towards the left. The distance to the airport was 8 NM (14.8 km). On this part of the final approach, the aircraft apparently entered an area of strong turbulence created by the proximity to the mountains. The GPWS then activated 9 seconds before impact. The crew reacted to this by applying power and initiating a pitch-up. At 10:22:23, 7.7 NM (14.2 km) from the airport at an altitude of 2975 feet (907 m), the aircraft collided with the top of the mountain Operafjellet 3.7 km to the right of the approach centerline.3. A malfunction occurred with the during the right turn to base.
Vnukovo Airlines flight VKO 2801 departed Vnukovo Airport at 04:44 GMT bound for Svalbard Airport Longyear. It was a chartered flight with workers and their families going to coal mining towns at Svalbard. The flight was normal until the start of the descent. Before radio contact with Longyear Information, the crew went through the detailed landing procedure for runway 10. At 09:56, the crew was cleared to start the descent. A little later, the crew received additional information consisting of runway in use 28, wind 230 degrees at 16 knots, visibility more than 10 km, rain showers, clouds: few at 1500 feet, scattered at 2000 feet and broken at 4000 feet, temp. 5 degrees C, dew point -0 degrees C and QNH 1005 hPa. (Later changed to 1006 hPa). The crew tried to request runway 10 for landing twice, but the request was not understood as such by Longyear Information due to language difficulties. When the flight was overhead the ADV beacon, at 10:15, the crew reported the position to Longyear Information and entered the base turn with a bank angle of 22 degrees. At 10:16, the aircraft came out of this turn on magnetic heading 160. During the right turn to the base turn, a malfunction occurred in the electric trimming mechanism, which was corrected by the crew. At 10:17, the crew started the turn to bring the aircraft out on the magnetic inbound course 300deg, as prescribed by the approach chart. The distance from the airport at this moment was 14 NM (25.9 km), as prescribed by the approach chart, but the lateral deviation from the outbound magnetic course 155 degrees from ADV was 2 NM (3.7 km) to the left. At 10:18, after the radio altimeter aural warning had been activated twice, the co-pilot took the controls and, after 6 seconds, turned the autopilot pitch channel off by ＇ overriding ＇ it. From then on until the impact, the flight continued in autopilot mode in the roll channel, and in manual mode in the pitch channel. The aircraft passed through the localizer centerline and when the turn had been completed, the aircraft rolled out on a magnetic heading of 290 degrees. At this time, there was a discussion within the crew as to whether or not the final turn had been made at the correct time. The discussion led to the roll out of the turn to final approach and a corrective turn to the right to magnetic heading 306 degrees. At this point, the aircraft was 14.7 NM (27.4 km) from the airport, 2.8 km to the right of the approach centerline, maintaining an altitude of 5000 feet (1520 m) and the crew increased the flap setting to 28 degrees. The airspeed was reduced to approx. 330 km/hr (180 kts). Instead of intercepting the centerline, the crew continued the flight on the right side, more or less paralleling the localizer course with minor heading changes. At 10:20 the flight made a corrective turn, resulting in a track close to 300 degrees. At this point, the lateral deviation from the approach centerline was 3.7 km to the right. During this corrective turn, the aircraft started descending. At 10:21, the crew made yet another corrective turn to the right. At 10:22:05, the aircraft started turning towards the left. The distance to the airport was 8 NM (14.8 km). On this part of the final approach, the aircraft apparently entered an area of strong turbulence created by the proximity to the mountains. The GPWS then activated 9 seconds before impact. The crew reacted to this by applying power and initiating a pitch-up. At 10:22:23, 7.7 NM (14.2 km) from the airport at an altitude of 2975 feet (907 m), the aircraft collided with the top of the mountain Operafjellet 3.7 km to the right of the approach centerline.2. The crew wanted to land on runway 10, but was unable to get clearance due to （ ）.
Vnukovo Airlines flight VKO 2801 departed Vnukovo Airport at 04:44 GMT bound for Svalbard Airport Longyear. It was a chartered flight with workers and their families going to coal mining towns at Svalbard. The flight was normal until the start of the descent. Before radio contact with Longyear Information, the crew went through the detailed landing procedure for runway 10. At 09:56, the crew was cleared to start the descent. A little later, the crew received additional information consisting of runway in use 28, wind 230 degrees at 16 knots, visibility more than 10 km, rain showers, clouds: few at 1500 feet, scattered at 2000 feet and broken at 4000 feet, temp. 5 degrees C, dew point -0 degrees C and QNH 1005 hPa. (Later changed to 1006 hPa). The crew tried to request runway 10 for landing twice, but the request was not understood as such by Longyear Information due to language difficulties. When the flight was overhead the ADV beacon, at 10:15, the crew reported the position to Longyear Information and entered the base turn with a bank angle of 22 degrees. At 10:16, the aircraft came out of this turn on magnetic heading 160. During the right turn to the base turn, a malfunction occurred in the electric trimming mechanism, which was corrected by the crew. At 10:17, the crew started the turn to bring the aircraft out on the magnetic inbound course 300deg, as prescribed by the approach chart. The distance from the airport at this moment was 14 NM (25.9 km), as prescribed by the approach chart, but the lateral deviation from the outbound magnetic course 155 degrees from ADV was 2 NM (3.7 km) to the left. At 10:18, after the radio altimeter aural warning had been activated twice, the co-pilot took the controls and, after 6 seconds, turned the autopilot pitch channel off by ＇ overriding ＇ it. From then on until the impact, the flight continued in autopilot mode in the roll channel, and in manual mode in the pitch channel. The aircraft passed through the localizer centerline and when the turn had been completed, the aircraft rolled out on a magnetic heading of 290 degrees. At this time, there was a discussion within the crew as to whether or not the final turn had been made at the correct time. The discussion led to the roll out of the turn to final approach and a corrective turn to the right to magnetic heading 306 degrees. At this point, the aircraft was 14.7 NM (27.4 km) from the airport, 2.8 km to the right of the approach centerline, maintaining an altitude of 5000 feet (1520 m) and the crew increased the flap setting to 28 degrees. The airspeed was reduced to approx. 330 km/hr (180 kts). Instead of intercepting the centerline, the crew continued the flight on the right side, more or less paralleling the localizer course with minor heading changes. At 10:20 the flight made a corrective turn, resulting in a track close to 300 degrees. At this point, the lateral deviation from the approach centerline was 3.7 km to the right. During this corrective turn, the aircraft started descending. At 10:21, the crew made yet another corrective turn to the right. At 10:22:05, the aircraft started turning towards the left. The distance to the airport was 8 NM (14.8 km). On this part of the final approach, the aircraft apparently entered an area of strong turbulence created by the proximity to the mountains. The GPWS then activated 9 seconds before impact. The crew reacted to this by applying power and initiating a pitch-up. At 10:22:23, 7.7 NM (14.2 km) from the airport at an altitude of 2975 feet (907 m), the aircraft collided with the top of the mountain Operafjellet 3.7 km to the right of the approach centerline.1. When did the flight become problematic?
By the end of 1995，a new soft ground arresting system should reduce potential damage to aircraft overshooting the runways at the New York and New Jersey airports. The new system will be installed at the end of two or three runways at JFK international (1995/1997), one at Newark International (1998), and two at LaGuardia Airport (1996), all falling short of the 1000 ft(350m) overrun required by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). In a four-year cooperative agreement, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, owners of the region’s three major airports, has agreed to fund up to $4.5 million jointly with the FAA, to complete research, design, installation and monitoring of the concrete based foam blocks, said to bring a four-engined Boeing 747 travelling at 60mph to a full stop in under 600ft (183m). Information gathered during operation of the first block, to be in place at JFK by the end of the year, is intended to be used by the FAA for the preparation of a nationwide standard. The system, designed by ESCO (Engineering Systems Company) has already been suc cessfully tested at the FAA’s Technical Center, but requires further detailed investigation before the design can be finalized. Questions that still need to be answered revolve around the ease of snow removal, maintenance, strength and longevity, and on how to stop animals burrowing into the soft material. These will ultimately determine the composition of the arrester blocks. A full-scale test with an aircraft will be undertaken at the Technical Center in June. The precast foam blocks comprise a mixture of foaming agents bound by cementations material, producing a low density, light weight aerated block with little tensile strength, so that it is easily crushed when overrun by an aircraft, simulating the effect of being bogged down in sand. This deliberate fragility will affect not only the size of the blocks and jointing, but also transportation. For this reason, ESCO will be setting up a precasting factory at JFK for the first installation covering an area of 150 ft (45m) --the width of the runways--by 540ft (165m) in length. 5. ESCO will be setting up a pre-casting factory at JFK just because .
By the end of 1995，a new soft ground arresting system should reduce potential damage to aircraft overshooting the runways at the New York and New Jersey airports. The new system will be installed at the end of two or three runways at JFK international (1995/1997), one at Newark International (1998), and two at LaGuardia Airport (1996), all falling short of the 1000 ft(350m) overrun required by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). In a four-year cooperative agreement, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, owners of the region’s three major airports, has agreed to fund up to $4.5 million jointly with the FAA, to complete research, design, installation and monitoring of the concrete based foam blocks, said to bring a four-engined Boeing 747 travelling at 60mph to a full stop in under 600ft (183m). Information gathered during operation of the first block, to be in place at JFK by the end of the year, is intended to be used by the FAA for the preparation of a nationwide standard. The system, designed by ESCO (Engineering Systems Company) has already been suc cessfully tested at the FAA’s Technical Center, but requires further detailed investigation before the design can be finalized. Questions that still need to be answered revolve around the ease of snow removal, maintenance, strength and longevity, and on how to stop animals burrowing into the soft material. These will ultimately determine the composition of the arrester blocks. A full-scale test with an aircraft will be undertaken at the Technical Center in June. The precast foam blocks comprise a mixture of foaming agents bound by cementations material, producing a low density, light weight aerated block with little tensile strength, so that it is easily crushed when overrun by an aircraft, simulating the effect of being bogged down in sand. This deliberate fragility will affect not only the size of the blocks and jointing, but also transportation. For this reason, ESCO will be setting up a precasting factory at JFK for the first installation covering an area of 150 ft (45m) --the width of the runways--by 540ft (165m) in length. 4. will ultimately determine the composition of the arrester blocks.
By the end of 1995，a new soft ground arresting system should reduce potential damage to aircraft overshooting the runways at the New York and New Jersey airports. The new system will be installed at the end of two or three runways at JFK international (1995/1997), one at Newark International (1998), and two at LaGuardia Airport (1996), all falling short of the 1000 ft(350m) overrun required by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). In a four-year cooperative agreement, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, owners of the region’s three major airports, has agreed to fund up to $4.5 million jointly with the FAA, to complete research, design, installation and monitoring of the concrete based foam blocks, said to bring a four-engined Boeing 747 travelling at 60mph to a full stop in under 600ft (183m). Information gathered during operation of the first block, to be in place at JFK by the end of the year, is intended to be used by the FAA for the preparation of a nationwide standard. The system, designed by ESCO (Engineering Systems Company) has already been suc cessfully tested at the FAA’s Technical Center, but requires further detailed investigation before the design can be finalized. Questions that still need to be answered revolve around the ease of snow removal, maintenance, strength and longevity, and on how to stop animals burrowing into the soft material. These will ultimately determine the composition of the arrester blocks. A full-scale test with an aircraft will be undertaken at the Technical Center in June. The precast foam blocks comprise a mixture of foaming agents bound by cementations material, producing a low density, light weight aerated block with little tensile strength, so that it is easily crushed when overrun by an aircraft, simulating the effect of being bogged down in sand. This deliberate fragility will affect not only the size of the blocks and jointing, but also transportation. For this reason, ESCO will be setting up a precasting factory at JFK for the first installation covering an area of 150 ft (45m) --the width of the runways--by 540ft (165m) in length. 3. Which of the following hasn＇t funded for the development of the new system?
