相关题目
Many pilots and controllers are taught to have three aims when using the RT: be clear, be concise and be correct. Naturally, good pronunciation, reasonable speed, and the use of standard phraseologies contribute to clear, concise and correct. But the use of human language to communicate is an art and not a science. There are some built-in problems in human language that contribute to potential problems in aviation communications. A few are mentioned below. 1. Readback Error – If ATC says, Cleared to land, Runway two six left, and the pilot reads back, Cleared to land, Runway two six right, the pilot has committed a Readback Error. With distractions, multi-tasking and a busy ATC frequency, this error can happen and can be difficult to catch. 2. Hearback Error – In the previous example, if the controller fails to hear the mistake in the Readback, the controller has committed Hearback Error. He failed to listen carefully to the pilot’s Readback. Since the vast majority of readbacks are correct, it takes great discipline to listen carefully to each readback. 3. Expectation Bias – Human beings have a tendency to hear what they expect to hear. If you are lined up on the runway waiting for a take-off clearance, you may believe that the next take-off clearance is for you, even though it may be for another aircraft on a parallel or intersecting runway. You heard what you expected to hear, and committed the error of Expectation Bias. 4. Assumption – If you always get a landing clearance just as you turn base, it is easy to assume as you turn base that you are cleared to land. The way to fight assumption error is to seek confirmation, I’m cleared to land, please confirm? Assumption has been a factor in many aviation accidents. 5. Ambiguity – an ambiguous statement is one that could have two or more different meanings. Ambiguity is difficult to completely avoid in human language in a complex situation. If you are doing touch and go and ATC says You’re number three to follow the twin, the statement may be very clear. But if there are two twins in front of you in the circuit, there is a risk you may mistake one twin for the other. The situation makes the instruction ambiguous – the meaning is not clear, and you may need to seek clarification. Naturally, all of these potential language problems could become more likely or more hazardous if one or both of the communicating parties has low English proficiency.3.In the following communication, what errors are made by the pilots and controllers? ATC: cleared to land, runway 26 left. Pilot: cleared to land, runway 26 right.
Many pilots and controllers are taught to have three aims when using the RT: be clear, be concise and be correct. Naturally, good pronunciation, reasonable speed, and the use of standard phraseologies contribute to clear, concise and correct. But the use of human language to communicate is an art and not a science. There are some built-in problems in human language that contribute to potential problems in aviation communications. A few are mentioned below. 1. Readback Error – If ATC says, Cleared to land, Runway two six left, and the pilot reads back, Cleared to land, Runway two six right, the pilot has committed a Readback Error. With distractions, multi-tasking and a busy ATC frequency, this error can happen and can be difficult to catch. 2. Hearback Error – In the previous example, if the controller fails to hear the mistake in the Readback, the controller has committed Hearback Error. He failed to listen carefully to the pilot’s Readback. Since the vast majority of readbacks are correct, it takes great discipline to listen carefully to each readback. 3. Expectation Bias – Human beings have a tendency to hear what they expect to hear. If you are lined up on the runway waiting for a take-off clearance, you may believe that the next take-off clearance is for you, even though it may be for another aircraft on a parallel or intersecting runway. You heard what you expected to hear, and committed the error of Expectation Bias. 4. Assumption – If you always get a landing clearance just as you turn base, it is easy to assume as you turn base that you are cleared to land. The way to fight assumption error is to seek confirmation, I’m cleared to land, please confirm? Assumption has been a factor in many aviation accidents. 5. Ambiguity – an ambiguous statement is one that could have two or more different meanings. Ambiguity is difficult to completely avoid in human language in a complex situation. If you are doing touch and go and ATC says You’re number three to follow the twin, the statement may be very clear. But if there are two twins in front of you in the circuit, there is a risk you may mistake one twin for the other. The situation makes the instruction ambiguous – the meaning is not clear, and you may need to seek clarification. Naturally, all of these potential language problems could become more likely or more hazardous if one or both of the communicating parties has low English proficiency.2.What items contribute to clear, concise and correct communication between pilot and controller?
Many pilots and controllers are taught to have three aims when using the RT: be clear, be concise and be correct. Naturally, good pronunciation, reasonable speed, and the use of standard phraseologies contribute to clear, concise and correct. But the use of human language to communicate is an art and not a science. There are some built-in problems in human language that contribute to potential problems in aviation communications. A few are mentioned below. 1. Readback Error – If ATC says, Cleared to land, Runway two six left, and the pilot reads back, Cleared to land, Runway two six right, the pilot has committed a Readback Error. With distractions, multi-tasking and a busy ATC frequency, this error can happen and can be difficult to catch. 2. Hearback Error – In the previous example, if the controller fails to hear the mistake in the Readback, the controller has committed Hearback Error. He failed to listen carefully to the pilot’s Readback. Since the vast majority of readbacks are correct, it takes great discipline to listen carefully to each readback. 3. Expectation Bias – Human beings have a tendency to hear what they expect to hear. If you are lined up on the runway waiting for a take-off clearance, you may believe that the next take-off clearance is for you, even though it may be for another aircraft on a parallel or intersecting runway. You heard what you expected to hear, and committed the error of Expectation Bias. 4. Assumption – If you always get a landing clearance just as you turn base, it is easy to assume as you turn base that you are cleared to land. The way to fight assumption error is to seek confirmation, I’m cleared to land, please confirm? Assumption has been a factor in many aviation accidents. 5. Ambiguity – an ambiguous statement is one that could have two or more different meanings. Ambiguity is difficult to completely avoid in human language in a complex situation. If you are doing touch and go and ATC says You’re number three to follow the twin, the statement may be very clear. But if there are two twins in front of you in the circuit, there is a risk you may mistake one twin for the other. The situation makes the instruction ambiguous – the meaning is not clear, and you may need to seek clarification. Naturally, all of these potential language problems could become more likely or more hazardous if one or both of the communicating parties has low English proficiency.1.What are the objectives when using the RT?
An Airbus A320-200 was being refueled at an aerodrome in England. After the refueling was completed, the refueling vehicle was driven away. But the refueling hose was not disconnected from the airplane. The refueling hose was torn out of the aircraft and dragged along the ground to the vehicle parking lot. Then the problem was finally discovered. The airplane was taken out of service for repairs to its refueling adapter ring and was returned to service the next day. An investigation by the refueling organization showed that the refueler had not complied with the vehicle’s checklist or with the refueling organization’s operations manual. Both the checklist and the manual required that he make sure all hoses were secure on the refueling vehicle before driving the vehicle away from an aircraft. Examination of the refueling vehicle showed a bent actuating rod on the vehicle’s refueling nozzle. This defect existed prior to this incident, and caused the nozzle detection system not to function. When working properly, the detection system prevents the vehicle’s engine from being started unless all nozzles are stowed correctly. This interlock system had been damaged sometime in the recent past. It was checked about ten days prior to the accident and was found to function properly. The refueler stated that his normal routine had been interrupted by a paperwork problem. As a result, he was distracted by filling out the paperwork, and then drove away, believing he had disconnected the refueling hoses and nozzle even though he had not really done so. The company repaired the refueling vehicle and agreed to further training for the driver. 5. Why did the refueler make the mistake according to refueler statement?
An Airbus A320-200 was being refueled at an aerodrome in England. After the refueling was completed, the refueling vehicle was driven away. But the refueling hose was not disconnected from the airplane. The refueling hose was torn out of the aircraft and dragged along the ground to the vehicle parking lot. Then the problem was finally discovered. The airplane was taken out of service for repairs to its refueling adapter ring and was returned to service the next day. An investigation by the refueling organization showed that the refueler had not complied with the vehicle’s checklist or with the refueling organization’s operations manual. Both the checklist and the manual required that he make sure all hoses were secure on the refueling vehicle before driving the vehicle away from an aircraft. Examination of the refueling vehicle showed a bent actuating rod on the vehicle’s refueling nozzle. This defect existed prior to this incident, and caused the nozzle detection system not to function. When working properly, the detection system prevents the vehicle’s engine from being started unless all nozzles are stowed correctly. This interlock system had been damaged sometime in the recent past. It was checked about ten days prior to the accident and was found to function properly. The refueler stated that his normal routine had been interrupted by a paperwork problem. As a result, he was distracted by filling out the paperwork, and then drove away, believing he had disconnected the refueling hoses and nozzle even though he had not really done so. The company repaired the refueling vehicle and agreed to further training for the driver. 4. Why did the nozzle detection system fail?
An Airbus A320-200 was being refueled at an aerodrome in England. After the refueling was completed, the refueling vehicle was driven away. But the refueling hose was not disconnected from the airplane. The refueling hose was torn out of the aircraft and dragged along the ground to the vehicle parking lot. Then the problem was finally discovered. The airplane was taken out of service for repairs to its refueling adapter ring and was returned to service the next day. An investigation by the refueling organization showed that the refueler had not complied with the vehicle’s checklist or with the refueling organization’s operations manual. Both the checklist and the manual required that he make sure all hoses were secure on the refueling vehicle before driving the vehicle away from an aircraft. Examination of the refueling vehicle showed a bent actuating rod on the vehicle’s refueling nozzle. This defect existed prior to this incident, and caused the nozzle detection system not to function. When working properly, the detection system prevents the vehicle’s engine from being started unless all nozzles are stowed correctly. This interlock system had been damaged sometime in the recent past. It was checked about ten days prior to the accident and was found to function properly. The refueler stated that his normal routine had been interrupted by a paperwork problem. As a result, he was distracted by filling out the paperwork, and then drove away, believing he had disconnected the refueling hoses and nozzle even though he had not really done so. The company repaired the refueling vehicle and agreed to further training for the driver. 3. Who should be responsible for the accident?
An Airbus A320-200 was being refueled at an aerodrome in England. After the refueling was completed, the refueling vehicle was driven away. But the refueling hose was not disconnected from the airplane. The refueling hose was torn out of the aircraft and dragged along the ground to the vehicle parking lot. Then the problem was finally discovered. The airplane was taken out of service for repairs to its refueling adapter ring and was returned to service the next day. An investigation by the refueling organization showed that the refueler had not complied with the vehicle’s checklist or with the refueling organization’s operations manual. Both the checklist and the manual required that he make sure all hoses were secure on the refueling vehicle before driving the vehicle away from an aircraft. Examination of the refueling vehicle showed a bent actuating rod on the vehicle’s refueling nozzle. This defect existed prior to this incident, and caused the nozzle detection system not to function. When working properly, the detection system prevents the vehicle’s engine from being started unless all nozzles are stowed correctly. This interlock system had been damaged sometime in the recent past. It was checked about ten days prior to the accident and was found to function properly. The refueler stated that his normal routine had been interrupted by a paperwork problem. As a result, he was distracted by filling out the paperwork, and then drove away, believing he had disconnected the refueling hoses and nozzle even though he had not really done so. The company repaired the refueling vehicle and agreed to further training for the driver. 2. Which part of the A320-200 was damaged by the refueling truck?
An Airbus A320-200 was being refueled at an aerodrome in England. After the refueling was completed, the refueling vehicle was driven away. But the refueling hose was not disconnected from the airplane. The refueling hose was torn out of the aircraft and dragged along the ground to the vehicle parking lot. Then the problem was finally discovered. The airplane was taken out of service for repairs to its refueling adapter ring and was returned to service the next day. An investigation by the refueling organization showed that the refueler had not complied with the vehicle’s checklist or with the refueling organization’s operations manual. Both the checklist and the manual required that he make sure all hoses were secure on the refueling vehicle before driving the vehicle away from an aircraft. Examination of the refueling vehicle showed a bent actuating rod on the vehicle’s refueling nozzle. This defect existed prior to this incident, and caused the nozzle detection system not to function. When working properly, the detection system prevents the vehicle’s engine from being started unless all nozzles are stowed correctly. This interlock system had been damaged sometime in the recent past. It was checked about ten days prior to the accident and was found to function properly. The refueler stated that his normal routine had been interrupted by a paperwork problem. As a result, he was distracted by filling out the paperwork, and then drove away, believing he had disconnected the refueling hoses and nozzle even though he had not really done so. The company repaired the refueling vehicle and agreed to further training for the driver. 1. What happed when the refueling vehicle was driven away?
The 747 was being operated on a scheduled passenger flight from Singapore to Frankfurt with four pilots, 14 cabin crew and 378 passengers. At the time of flight planning in Singapore, the terminal aerodrome forecast for Frankfurt indicated CAVOK conditions at the estimated time of arrival (ETA), and there was no requirement to plan for an alternate aerodrome. The fuel uplift at Singapore for the flight to Frankfurt was in accordance with the operators’ Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) of Australia-approved fuel policy. The 747 departed Singapore on 27 July at 1521. The ETA for Frankfurt was 0319 on 28 July. The 0220 Frankfurt routine aviation weather report obtained by the crew included information that CAVOK conditions existed, with no significant changes expected. The crew of the 747 commenced descent into Frankfurt at about 0300, and the Frankfurt automatic terminal information service provided the crew with information that CAVOK conditions existed. As the 747 approached position GED, which was 35 NM from Frankfurt, the air traffic controller instructed the crew to enter a holding pattern at GED. As the 747 was in the holding pattern, radio transmissions from the crews of other aircraft alerted the crew of the 747 that the weather conditions at Frankfurt had suddenly deteriorated, and that there were thunderstorms and heavy rain showers at the aerodrome. The crew elected to divert the 747 to Munich, where it landed without further incident. A number of other international flights were similarly affected. Because of the unexpected and unscheduled diversion from Frankfurt, the reserve fuel remaining on board the 747 when it arrived at Munich was less than that required by the operators CASA approved fuel policy for the planned flight. Note: CAVOK conditions are: Visibility 10 km or more; No cloud below 5,000 ft or below the highest minimum sector altitude, whichever is the greater, and no cumulonimbus; No precipitation, thunderstorm, shallow fog, low drifting snow or dust devils.5. What was the problem of 747?
The 747 was being operated on a scheduled passenger flight from Singapore to Frankfurt with four pilots, 14 cabin crew and 378 passengers. At the time of flight planning in Singapore, the terminal aerodrome forecast for Frankfurt indicated CAVOK conditions at the estimated time of arrival (ETA), and there was no requirement to plan for an alternate aerodrome. The fuel uplift at Singapore for the flight to Frankfurt was in accordance with the operators’ Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) of Australia-approved fuel policy. The 747 departed Singapore on 27 July at 1521. The ETA for Frankfurt was 0319 on 28 July. The 0220 Frankfurt routine aviation weather report obtained by the crew included information that CAVOK conditions existed, with no significant changes expected. The crew of the 747 commenced descent into Frankfurt at about 0300, and the Frankfurt automatic terminal information service provided the crew with information that CAVOK conditions existed. As the 747 approached position GED, which was 35 NM from Frankfurt, the air traffic controller instructed the crew to enter a holding pattern at GED. As the 747 was in the holding pattern, radio transmissions from the crews of other aircraft alerted the crew of the 747 that the weather conditions at Frankfurt had suddenly deteriorated, and that there were thunderstorms and heavy rain showers at the aerodrome. The crew elected to divert the 747 to Munich, where it landed without further incident. A number of other international flights were similarly affected. Because of the unexpected and unscheduled diversion from Frankfurt, the reserve fuel remaining on board the 747 when it arrived at Munich was less than that required by the operators CASA approved fuel policy for the planned flight. Note: CAVOK conditions are: Visibility 10 km or more; No cloud below 5,000 ft or below the highest minimum sector altitude, whichever is the greater, and no cumulonimbus; No precipitation, thunderstorm, shallow fog, low drifting snow or dust devils.4. What was the decision of crew when they were in the holding pattern?
