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BOSTON -- An Aer Lingus Airbus with 260 passengers on board almost collided with a U.S. Airways jet taking off from Boston＇s Logan Airport. The near collision, which was avoided by a pilot＇s quick thinking, is now under investigation by the National Transportation Safety Board and the Federal Aviation Administration. The near miss occurred on June 9, 1995 after both jets had been wrongly cleared for near-simultaneous takeoff at intersecting runways. The Shannon-bound Aer Lingus plane, which had twelve crewmembers on board in addition to the passengers, had just taken off as the U.S. Airways plane was heading down the other runway and about to do the same. The difference between the near miss and what would have been a disastrous collision was only a few seconds. The U.S. Airways plane, a Boeing 737, was bound for Philadelphia with 103 passengers and six crewmembers. Investigators immediately pointed to an operational error by air traffic controllers as the cause of the incident. The closest that the two aircraft came to each other was estimated as 200 feet. Pilots must file a near miss report if planes come to within 500 feet of each other. The Boston Globe reported that the Aer Lingus pilot had filed such a report. The newspaper quoted a Logan air traffic controller as describing the distance between the two planes as being exceptionally close. The source also stated that the control tower was two employees short on the evening of the incident. The Aer Lingus plane was cleared for takeoff on Logan＇s Runway 15R. According to the NTSB, the U.S. Airways Boeing was then cleared on the intersecting Runway 9. The time lapse between the clearances, which were given by separate controllers, was just five seconds. With the Aer Lingus plane gathering speed for takeoff, the U.S. Airways 737 began its acceleration. The NTSB report stated that the Aer Lingus pilot had reported V1. According to the preliminary report, the co-pilot noticed the Aer Lingus A330 rotating just prior to the intersection of runways 15R and 9. The U.S. Airways co-pilot told his captain to keep it down and pushed the control column forward to ensure that the Boeing stayed on the ground. He later stated to the NTSB: The Airbus passed overhead with very little separation and once cleared of the intersection our captain rotated, and we lifted off towards the end of the runway. I reported to departure control that we had a near miss at which time Aer Lingus reported ＇we concur.＇ A statement from Aer Lingus, issued from its North American headquarters on Long Island, said that after take-off the Aer Lingus flight crew had contacted Logan tower to report the close proximity of a second aircraft. Following strict guidelines, the Aer Lingus Safety Unit in Ireland had then reported the incident to Irish Aviation authorities and the National Transportation Safety Board in the U.S. FAA spokesman Jim Peters said that there have been seven runway incursions so far this year at Logan Airport, with the June 9 incident being by far the most serious. An incursion involves the improper entry of a vehicle, worker or other aircraft onto a runway that has been cleared by a controller for take-off or landing. Only two of the seven incursions involved operational error by an air traffic controller, with most coming from pilot deviation, Peters said. Peters confirmed that the two air traffic controllers who had simultaneously directed the Aer Lingus and U.S. Airways planes down intersecting runways were now receiving corrective action by the FAA. They are being de-certified until a retraining plan has been implemented, he said. They have been relieved of any local control positions while they are undergoing the retraining, but they do continue to work in other positions in the tower. Peters said that it is unlikely that the controllers would be fired under these circumstances. Under the labor agreement, loss of jobs could be an outcome if there were several such incidents involving operational error, he said. The National Transportation Safety Board is expected to issue a final report in several months. The report will examine in detail the causes of the near-collision.3. How many runway incursions occurred before June 9 in 1995 at Logan airport?
BOSTON -- An Aer Lingus Airbus with 260 passengers on board almost collided with a U.S. Airways jet taking off from Boston＇s Logan Airport. The near collision, which was avoided by a pilot＇s quick thinking, is now under investigation by the National Transportation Safety Board and the Federal Aviation Administration. The near miss occurred on June 9, 1995 after both jets had been wrongly cleared for near-simultaneous takeoff at intersecting runways. The Shannon-bound Aer Lingus plane, which had twelve crewmembers on board in addition to the passengers, had just taken off as the U.S. Airways plane was heading down the other runway and about to do the same. The difference between the near miss and what would have been a disastrous collision was only a few seconds. The U.S. Airways plane, a Boeing 737, was bound for Philadelphia with 103 passengers and six crewmembers. Investigators immediately pointed to an operational error by air traffic controllers as the cause of the incident. The closest that the two aircraft came to each other was estimated as 200 feet. Pilots must file a near miss report if planes come to within 500 feet of each other. The Boston Globe reported that the Aer Lingus pilot had filed such a report. The newspaper quoted a Logan air traffic controller as describing the distance between the two planes as being exceptionally close. The source also stated that the control tower was two employees short on the evening of the incident. The Aer Lingus plane was cleared for takeoff on Logan＇s Runway 15R. According to the NTSB, the U.S. Airways Boeing was then cleared on the intersecting Runway 9. The time lapse between the clearances, which were given by separate controllers, was just five seconds. With the Aer Lingus plane gathering speed for takeoff, the U.S. Airways 737 began its acceleration. The NTSB report stated that the Aer Lingus pilot had reported V1. According to the preliminary report, the co-pilot noticed the Aer Lingus A330 rotating just prior to the intersection of runways 15R and 9. The U.S. Airways co-pilot told his captain to keep it down and pushed the control column forward to ensure that the Boeing stayed on the ground. He later stated to the NTSB: The Airbus passed overhead with very little separation and once cleared of the intersection our captain rotated, and we lifted off towards the end of the runway. I reported to departure control that we had a near miss at which time Aer Lingus reported ＇we concur.＇ A statement from Aer Lingus, issued from its North American headquarters on Long Island, said that after take-off the Aer Lingus flight crew had contacted Logan tower to report the close proximity of a second aircraft. Following strict guidelines, the Aer Lingus Safety Unit in Ireland had then reported the incident to Irish Aviation authorities and the National Transportation Safety Board in the U.S. FAA spokesman Jim Peters said that there have been seven runway incursions so far this year at Logan Airport, with the June 9 incident being by far the most serious. An incursion involves the improper entry of a vehicle, worker or other aircraft onto a runway that has been cleared by a controller for take-off or landing. Only two of the seven incursions involved operational error by an air traffic controller, with most coming from pilot deviation, Peters said. Peters confirmed that the two air traffic controllers who had simultaneously directed the Aer Lingus and U.S. Airways planes down intersecting runways were now receiving corrective action by the FAA. They are being de-certified until a retraining plan has been implemented, he said. They have been relieved of any local control positions while they are undergoing the retraining, but they do continue to work in other positions in the tower. Peters said that it is unlikely that the controllers would be fired under these circumstances. Under the labor agreement, loss of jobs could be an outcome if there were several such incidents involving operational error, he said. The National Transportation Safety Board is expected to issue a final report in several months. The report will examine in detail the causes of the near-collision.2. Why did the controllers commit an operation error?
BOSTON -- An Aer Lingus Airbus with 260 passengers on board almost collided with a U.S. Airways jet taking off from Boston＇s Logan Airport. The near collision, which was avoided by a pilot＇s quick thinking, is now under investigation by the National Transportation Safety Board and the Federal Aviation Administration. The near miss occurred on June 9, 1995 after both jets had been wrongly cleared for near-simultaneous takeoff at intersecting runways. The Shannon-bound Aer Lingus plane, which had twelve crewmembers on board in addition to the passengers, had just taken off as the U.S. Airways plane was heading down the other runway and about to do the same. The difference between the near miss and what would have been a disastrous collision was only a few seconds. The U.S. Airways plane, a Boeing 737, was bound for Philadelphia with 103 passengers and six crewmembers. Investigators immediately pointed to an operational error by air traffic controllers as the cause of the incident. The closest that the two aircraft came to each other was estimated as 200 feet. Pilots must file a near miss report if planes come to within 500 feet of each other. The Boston Globe reported that the Aer Lingus pilot had filed such a report. The newspaper quoted a Logan air traffic controller as describing the distance between the two planes as being exceptionally close. The source also stated that the control tower was two employees short on the evening of the incident. The Aer Lingus plane was cleared for takeoff on Logan＇s Runway 15R. According to the NTSB, the U.S. Airways Boeing was then cleared on the intersecting Runway 9. The time lapse between the clearances, which were given by separate controllers, was just five seconds. With the Aer Lingus plane gathering speed for takeoff, the U.S. Airways 737 began its acceleration. The NTSB report stated that the Aer Lingus pilot had reported V1. According to the preliminary report, the co-pilot noticed the Aer Lingus A330 rotating just prior to the intersection of runways 15R and 9. The U.S. Airways co-pilot told his captain to keep it down and pushed the control column forward to ensure that the Boeing stayed on the ground. He later stated to the NTSB: The Airbus passed overhead with very little separation and once cleared of the intersection our captain rotated, and we lifted off towards the end of the runway. I reported to departure control that we had a near miss at which time Aer Lingus reported ＇we concur.＇ A statement from Aer Lingus, issued from its North American headquarters on Long Island, said that after take-off the Aer Lingus flight crew had contacted Logan tower to report the close proximity of a second aircraft. Following strict guidelines, the Aer Lingus Safety Unit in Ireland had then reported the incident to Irish Aviation authorities and the National Transportation Safety Board in the U.S. FAA spokesman Jim Peters said that there have been seven runway incursions so far this year at Logan Airport, with the June 9 incident being by far the most serious. An incursion involves the improper entry of a vehicle, worker or other aircraft onto a runway that has been cleared by a controller for take-off or landing. Only two of the seven incursions involved operational error by an air traffic controller, with most coming from pilot deviation, Peters said. Peters confirmed that the two air traffic controllers who had simultaneously directed the Aer Lingus and U.S. Airways planes down intersecting runways were now receiving corrective action by the FAA. They are being de-certified until a retraining plan has been implemented, he said. They have been relieved of any local control positions while they are undergoing the retraining, but they do continue to work in other positions in the tower. Peters said that it is unlikely that the controllers would be fired under these circumstances. Under the labor agreement, loss of jobs could be an outcome if there were several such incidents involving operational error, he said. The National Transportation Safety Board is expected to issue a final report in several months. The report will examine in detail the causes of the near-collision.1. Who avoided the near miss?
Read-back requirements have been introduced in the interests of flight safety. The importance of the read-back requirement is directly related to the possible seriousness of misunderstanding. Strict read-back procedures make sure that the clearance or instruction has been received and understood correctly by the correct aircraft. The flight crew shall read back to the air traffic controller safety-related parts of ATC clearances and instructions that are transmitted by voice. The Air Traffic Controller is responsible for checking the completeness and accuracy for the read back. The following items shall always be read back: a. ATC route clearances. b. Clearances and instructions to enter, land on, take off on, hold short of, cross and backtrack on any runway. c. Runway in use, altimeter settings, SSR codes, level instructions, heading and speed instructions and, whether issued by the controller or contained in ATIS broadcast, transition level. d. Other clearances, including conditional clearances, shall be read back or acknowledged in a manner to clearly indicate that they have been understood and will be complied with. An aircraft must include its call sign in the readback, and a failure to do this shall be challenged by the controller. TAXI INSTRUCTIONS When a taxi clearance contains a taxi limit beyond a runway, it shall contain a stated clearance to cross the runway, or a stated instruction to hold short, even if the runway is not in use. Communication with any aircraft using the runway for the purpose of taxiing should be transferred from the ground controller to the aerodrome controller before the aircraft enters or crosses the runway. For more complicated taxi instructions, it may be appropriate to divide the message into segments, placing the clearances and instructions in sequential order, to avoid the possibility of pilot misunderstanding.5. What shall be contained in a controller’s clearance when a taxi clearance contains a taxi limit beyond a runway?
Read-back requirements have been introduced in the interests of flight safety. The importance of the read-back requirement is directly related to the possible seriousness of misunderstanding. Strict read-back procedures make sure that the clearance or instruction has been received and understood correctly by the correct aircraft. The flight crew shall read back to the air traffic controller safety-related parts of ATC clearances and instructions that are transmitted by voice. The Air Traffic Controller is responsible for checking the completeness and accuracy for the read back. The following items shall always be read back: a. ATC route clearances. b. Clearances and instructions to enter, land on, take off on, hold short of, cross and backtrack on any runway. c. Runway in use, altimeter settings, SSR codes, level instructions, heading and speed instructions and, whether issued by the controller or contained in ATIS broadcast, transition level. d. Other clearances, including conditional clearances, shall be read back or acknowledged in a manner to clearly indicate that they have been understood and will be complied with. An aircraft must include its call sign in the readback, and a failure to do this shall be challenged by the controller. TAXI INSTRUCTIONS When a taxi clearance contains a taxi limit beyond a runway, it shall contain a stated clearance to cross the runway, or a stated instruction to hold short, even if the runway is not in use. Communication with any aircraft using the runway for the purpose of taxiing should be transferred from the ground controller to the aerodrome controller before the aircraft enters or crosses the runway. For more complicated taxi instructions, it may be appropriate to divide the message into segments, placing the clearances and instructions in sequential order, to avoid the possibility of pilot misunderstanding.4. What item is not included in the readback requirement?
Read-back requirements have been introduced in the interests of flight safety. The importance of the read-back requirement is directly related to the possible seriousness of misunderstanding. Strict read-back procedures make sure that the clearance or instruction has been received and understood correctly by the correct aircraft. The flight crew shall read back to the air traffic controller safety-related parts of ATC clearances and instructions that are transmitted by voice. The Air Traffic Controller is responsible for checking the completeness and accuracy for the read back. The following items shall always be read back: a. ATC route clearances. b. Clearances and instructions to enter, land on, take off on, hold short of, cross and backtrack on any runway. c. Runway in use, altimeter settings, SSR codes, level instructions, heading and speed instructions and, whether issued by the controller or contained in ATIS broadcast, transition level. d. Other clearances, including conditional clearances, shall be read back or acknowledged in a manner to clearly indicate that they have been understood and will be complied with. An aircraft must include its call sign in the readback, and a failure to do this shall be challenged by the controller. TAXI INSTRUCTIONS When a taxi clearance contains a taxi limit beyond a runway, it shall contain a stated clearance to cross the runway, or a stated instruction to hold short, even if the runway is not in use. Communication with any aircraft using the runway for the purpose of taxiing should be transferred from the ground controller to the aerodrome controller before the aircraft enters or crosses the runway. For more complicated taxi instructions, it may be appropriate to divide the message into segments, placing the clearances and instructions in sequential order, to avoid the possibility of pilot misunderstanding.3. Who shall listen to the pilot’s read-back to ascertain that the clearance or instruction has been correctly acknowledged by the flight crew?
Read-back requirements have been introduced in the interests of flight safety. The importance of the read-back requirement is directly related to the possible seriousness of misunderstanding. Strict read-back procedures make sure that the clearance or instruction has been received and understood correctly by the correct aircraft. The flight crew shall read back to the air traffic controller safety-related parts of ATC clearances and instructions that are transmitted by voice. The Air Traffic Controller is responsible for checking the completeness and accuracy for the read back. The following items shall always be read back: a. ATC route clearances. b. Clearances and instructions to enter, land on, take off on, hold short of, cross and backtrack on any runway. c. Runway in use, altimeter settings, SSR codes, level instructions, heading and speed instructions and, whether issued by the controller or contained in ATIS broadcast, transition level. d. Other clearances, including conditional clearances, shall be read back or acknowledged in a manner to clearly indicate that they have been understood and will be complied with. An aircraft must include its call sign in the readback, and a failure to do this shall be challenged by the controller. TAXI INSTRUCTIONS When a taxi clearance contains a taxi limit beyond a runway, it shall contain a stated clearance to cross the runway, or a stated instruction to hold short, even if the runway is not in use. Communication with any aircraft using the runway for the purpose of taxiing should be transferred from the ground controller to the aerodrome controller before the aircraft enters or crosses the runway. For more complicated taxi instructions, it may be appropriate to divide the message into segments, placing the clearances and instructions in sequential order, to avoid the possibility of pilot misunderstanding.2. Strict read-back procedures make sure that（ ）.
Read-back requirements have been introduced in the interests of flight safety. The importance of the read-back requirement is directly related to the possible seriousness of misunderstanding. Strict read-back procedures make sure that the clearance or instruction has been received and understood correctly by the correct aircraft. The flight crew shall read back to the air traffic controller safety-related parts of ATC clearances and instructions that are transmitted by voice. The Air Traffic Controller is responsible for checking the completeness and accuracy for the read back. The following items shall always be read back: a. ATC route clearances. b. Clearances and instructions to enter, land on, take off on, hold short of, cross and backtrack on any runway. c. Runway in use, altimeter settings, SSR codes, level instructions, heading and speed instructions and, whether issued by the controller or contained in ATIS broadcast, transition level. d. Other clearances, including conditional clearances, shall be read back or acknowledged in a manner to clearly indicate that they have been understood and will be complied with. An aircraft must include its call sign in the readback, and a failure to do this shall be challenged by the controller. TAXI INSTRUCTIONS When a taxi clearance contains a taxi limit beyond a runway, it shall contain a stated clearance to cross the runway, or a stated instruction to hold short, even if the runway is not in use. Communication with any aircraft using the runway for the purpose of taxiing should be transferred from the ground controller to the aerodrome controller before the aircraft enters or crosses the runway. For more complicated taxi instructions, it may be appropriate to divide the message into segments, placing the clearances and instructions in sequential order, to avoid the possibility of pilot misunderstanding.1. For what purpose has the readback requirement been introduced?
A recent Eurocontrol study determined that Europe averages about one runway incursion a day and one potentially very serious runway incursion every 14 days. An FAA study of data from 1997 to 2001 showed similar numbers for the United States. Many organizations believe that the problem of runway incursions must be attacked or it is bound to increase with an increase in world aviation activity. In fact, the number of reported incursions has been increasing at a faster rate than the number of flights worldwide has been increasing. One study group determined that a 20 percent increase in aircraft operating at a particular airport produced a 140 percent increase in the possibility of runway incursions. Other studies have used mathematical models which predict a big increase in the potential for runway incursions in the next twenty years. Some Statistics EuroControl Statistical Reference Area (ERSA) has the following data for the number of runway incursions per million flights: ? 1998 – 3 incursions per million flights ? 1999 – 6 incursions per million flights ? 2000 – 10 incursions per million flights ? 2001 – 23 incursions per million flights ? 2002 – 21 incursions per million flights ? 2003 – 40 incursions per million flights Several organizations , including the FAA and EuroControl, had similar data on the major cause of reported runway incursions: ? Pilot Error was determined to be the cause in 51 percent of all reported runway incursions. ? Vehicle or Pedestrian Error was determined to be the cause in 29 percent of reported incursions. ? Controller Error was determined to be the cause in 20 percent of reported incursions.EuroControl also classified several years of runway incursion reports according to seriousness. Their data was similar to FAA data using a similar classification: ? About 31% of reported incursions were classified as having No Risk. ? Another 34% were classified as having Some Risk . ? And 30% were classified as having Significant Risk. That totals 95%. ? The other 5% of reported Incursions were classified as being Extremely Hazardous. We will be coming back to look more carefully at some of this data later in the module. And we will look in great detail at most of the causal factors and at some real world.5. How many levels of runway incursions are there in terms of seriousness?
A recent Eurocontrol study determined that Europe averages about one runway incursion a day and one potentially very serious runway incursion every 14 days. An FAA study of data from 1997 to 2001 showed similar numbers for the United States. Many organizations believe that the problem of runway incursions must be attacked or it is bound to increase with an increase in world aviation activity. In fact, the number of reported incursions has been increasing at a faster rate than the number of flights worldwide has been increasing. One study group determined that a 20 percent increase in aircraft operating at a particular airport produced a 140 percent increase in the possibility of runway incursions. Other studies have used mathematical models which predict a big increase in the potential for runway incursions in the next twenty years. Some Statistics EuroControl Statistical Reference Area (ERSA) has the following data for the number of runway incursions per million flights: ? 1998 – 3 incursions per million flights ? 1999 – 6 incursions per million flights ? 2000 – 10 incursions per million flights ? 2001 – 23 incursions per million flights ? 2002 – 21 incursions per million flights ? 2003 – 40 incursions per million flights Several organizations , including the FAA and EuroControl, had similar data on the major cause of reported runway incursions: ? Pilot Error was determined to be the cause in 51 percent of all reported runway incursions. ? Vehicle or Pedestrian Error was determined to be the cause in 29 percent of reported incursions. ? Controller Error was determined to be the cause in 20 percent of reported incursions.EuroControl also classified several years of runway incursion reports according to seriousness. Their data was similar to FAA data using a similar classification: ? About 31% of reported incursions were classified as having No Risk. ? Another 34% were classified as having Some Risk . ? And 30% were classified as having Significant Risk. That totals 95%. ? The other 5% of reported Incursions were classified as being Extremely Hazardous. We will be coming back to look more carefully at some of this data later in the module. And we will look in great detail at most of the causal factors and at some real world.4. Who should be responsible for the runway incursion according to the passage?
