相关题目
An MD80 was level at FL340 heading north, about to descend. The controller did not detect a converging eastbound B737 and, therefore, cleared the MD80 to descend to FL300. When the MD80 started its descent, a Short Term Conflict Alert was triggered. In the attempt to rectify the error, the controller instructed the MD80 to stop the descent. Under stress, he issued a confusing instruction for the B737 to turn. The pilot did not respond. At this point, both aircraft received a coordinate RA: The MD80 received a Climb RA that he followed correctly while advising the controller. The B737 pilot received a Descend RA, which was also complied with. As a result of the coordinated Climb and Descend RAs, the two aircraft passed each other with a vertical separation of 1400 feet and a horizontal separation of 0.6 nautical miles. A simulation undertaken later showed that the vertical separation would have been only 100 feet without these maneuvers. 4. What eventually prevented an air miss from happening?
An MD80 was level at FL340 heading north, about to descend. The controller did not detect a converging eastbound B737 and, therefore, cleared the MD80 to descend to FL300. When the MD80 started its descent, a Short Term Conflict Alert was triggered. In the attempt to rectify the error, the controller instructed the MD80 to stop the descent. Under stress, he issued a confusing instruction for the B737 to turn. The pilot did not respond. At this point, both aircraft received a coordinate RA: The MD80 received a Climb RA that he followed correctly while advising the controller. The B737 pilot received a Descend RA, which was also complied with. As a result of the coordinated Climb and Descend RAs, the two aircraft passed each other with a vertical separation of 1400 feet and a horizontal separation of 0.6 nautical miles. A simulation undertaken later showed that the vertical separation would have been only 100 feet without these maneuvers. 3. Who or what is responsible for the occurrence of the incident?
An MD80 was level at FL340 heading north, about to descend. The controller did not detect a converging eastbound B737 and, therefore, cleared the MD80 to descend to FL300. When the MD80 started its descent, a Short Term Conflict Alert was triggered. In the attempt to rectify the error, the controller instructed the MD80 to stop the descent. Under stress, he issued a confusing instruction for the B737 to turn. The pilot did not respond. At this point, both aircraft received a coordinate RA: The MD80 received a Climb RA that he followed correctly while advising the controller. The B737 pilot received a Descend RA, which was also complied with. As a result of the coordinated Climb and Descend RAs, the two aircraft passed each other with a vertical separation of 1400 feet and a horizontal separation of 0.6 nautical miles. A simulation undertaken later showed that the vertical separation would have been only 100 feet without these maneuvers. 2. From the perspective of the MD80 pilot, what is the position of conflicting traffic?
An MD80 was level at FL340 heading north, about to descend. The controller did not detect a converging eastbound B737 and, therefore, cleared the MD80 to descend to FL300. When the MD80 started its descent, a Short Term Conflict Alert was triggered. In the attempt to rectify the error, the controller instructed the MD80 to stop the descent. Under stress, he issued a confusing instruction for the B737 to turn. The pilot did not respond. At this point, both aircraft received a coordinate RA: The MD80 received a Climb RA that he followed correctly while advising the controller. The B737 pilot received a Descend RA, which was also complied with. As a result of the coordinated Climb and Descend RAs, the two aircraft passed each other with a vertical separation of 1400 feet and a horizontal separation of 0.6 nautical miles. A simulation undertaken later showed that the vertical separation would have been only 100 feet without these maneuvers. 1. What is the nature of the incident?
On arrival at a major UK airport, we entered a hold at FL150 with 30 minutes delay due to strong winds. We stepped down in the hold pattern by approximately 1000 feet each hold, i.e. 150, 140, 130, 120, 110, 100, 90. We were transferred to the Director at around FL100. The next clearance was understood as DESCEND FL80, which was our next lower level. At or near FL80, ATC asked if we had TURNED to heading 080. Need I describe the dreadful feeling? Mortified! I apologized on the R/T. ATC responded, No problem, gave updated heading and clearance for further descent. However, that airport is not the place to be at the wrong level and heading on a busy and rough Sunday night! Having given the incident much thought in the days following the incident, I believe that a major contributing factor was the expectation, quite reasonably in a sense, of further descent to FL80 and hearing what we thought we should hear, thus confusing heading with cleared level. As vulnerable as one can be on a new type, it could have happened on my previous type (23 years, 13,000 hours). In addition, I had a good first officer. 5. What was the result of the incident?
On arrival at a major UK airport, we entered a hold at FL150 with 30 minutes delay due to strong winds. We stepped down in the hold pattern by approximately 1000 feet each hold, i.e. 150, 140, 130, 120, 110, 100, 90. We were transferred to the Director at around FL100. The next clearance was understood as DESCEND FL80, which was our next lower level. At or near FL80, ATC asked if we had TURNED to heading 080. Need I describe the dreadful feeling? Mortified! I apologized on the R/T. ATC responded, No problem, gave updated heading and clearance for further descent. However, that airport is not the place to be at the wrong level and heading on a busy and rough Sunday night! Having given the incident much thought in the days following the incident, I believe that a major contributing factor was the expectation, quite reasonably in a sense, of further descent to FL80 and hearing what we thought we should hear, thus confusing heading with cleared level. As vulnerable as one can be on a new type, it could have happened on my previous type (23 years, 13,000 hours). In addition, I had a good first officer. 4. What is an important cause of the incident?
On arrival at a major UK airport, we entered a hold at FL150 with 30 minutes delay due to strong winds. We stepped down in the hold pattern by approximately 1000 feet each hold, i.e. 150, 140, 130, 120, 110, 100, 90. We were transferred to the Director at around FL100. The next clearance was understood as DESCEND FL80, which was our next lower level. At or near FL80, ATC asked if we had TURNED to heading 080. Need I describe the dreadful feeling? Mortified! I apologized on the R/T. ATC responded, No problem, gave updated heading and clearance for further descent. However, that airport is not the place to be at the wrong level and heading on a busy and rough Sunday night! Having given the incident much thought in the days following the incident, I believe that a major contributing factor was the expectation, quite reasonably in a sense, of further descent to FL80 and hearing what we thought we should hear, thus confusing heading with cleared level. As vulnerable as one can be on a new type, it could have happened on my previous type (23 years, 13,000 hours). In addition, I had a good first officer. 3. Why did the pilot feel mortified?
On arrival at a major UK airport, we entered a hold at FL150 with 30 minutes delay due to strong winds. We stepped down in the hold pattern by approximately 1000 feet each hold, i.e. 150, 140, 130, 120, 110, 100, 90. We were transferred to the Director at around FL100. The next clearance was understood as DESCEND FL80, which was our next lower level. At or near FL80, ATC asked if we had TURNED to heading 080. Need I describe the dreadful feeling? Mortified! I apologized on the R/T. ATC responded, No problem, gave updated heading and clearance for further descent. However, that airport is not the place to be at the wrong level and heading on a busy and rough Sunday night! Having given the incident much thought in the days following the incident, I believe that a major contributing factor was the expectation, quite reasonably in a sense, of further descent to FL80 and hearing what we thought we should hear, thus confusing heading with cleared level. As vulnerable as one can be on a new type, it could have happened on my previous type (23 years, 13,000 hours). In addition, I had a good first officer. 2. What was the aircraft instructed by ATC to do at around FL100.
On arrival at a major UK airport, we entered a hold at FL150 with 30 minutes delay due to strong winds. We stepped down in the hold pattern by approximately 1000 feet each hold, i.e. 150, 140, 130, 120, 110, 100, 90. We were transferred to the Director at around FL100. The next clearance was understood as DESCEND FL80, which was our next lower level. At or near FL80, ATC asked if we had TURNED to heading 080. Need I describe the dreadful feeling? Mortified! I apologized on the R/T. ATC responded, No problem, gave updated heading and clearance for further descent. However, that airport is not the place to be at the wrong level and heading on a busy and rough Sunday night! Having given the incident much thought in the days following the incident, I believe that a major contributing factor was the expectation, quite reasonably in a sense, of further descent to FL80 and hearing what we thought we should hear, thus confusing heading with cleared level. As vulnerable as one can be on a new type, it could have happened on my previous type (23 years, 13,000 hours). In addition, I had a good first officer. 1. What does stepped down in the first paragraph mean?
An aircraft stall results from a rapid decrease in lift caused by the separation of airflow from the wing’s surface brought on by exceeding the critical angle of attack. A stall can occur at any pitch attitude or airspeed. Stalls are one of the most misunderstood areas of aerodynamics because pilots often believe an airfoil stops producing lift when it stalls. In a stall, the wing does not totally stop producing lift. Rather, it cannot generate adequate lift to sustain level flight. Since lift increases with an increase in angle of attack, at some point the lift peaks and then begins to drop off. The amount of lift the wing produces drops dramatically after the critical angle of attack is exceeded, but as stated above, it does not completely stop producing lift. In most straight-wing aircraft, the wing is designed to stall the wing root first. The wing root reaches its critical angle of attack first, making the stall progress outward toward the wingtip. By having the wing root stall first, aileron effectiveness is maintained at the wingtips, maintaining controllability of the aircraft. Various design methods are used to achieve the stalling of the wing root first. In one design, the wing is twisted to a higher angle of attack at the wing root. Installing stall strips on the first 20–25 percent of the wing’s leading edge is another method to introduce a stall prematurely.5. What measures can be taken to improve stall characteristics of an aircraft?
