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On the night of Dec. 16, 1997, the crew of Air Canada Flight 646, a Canadair Regional Jet, conducted a Category I instrument landing system (ILS) approach to Runway 15 at the airport in Fredericton, New Brunswick, Canada. The ceiling and visibility were below the minimums published for the instrument approach. Nevertheless, the runway visual range on Runway 15 was 1,200 feet, and the crew was authorized by Canadian regulations to conduct the approach under these conditions. The captain saw the runway approach lights when the aircraft was 100 feet above decision height. The first officer, the pilot flying, disconnected the autopilot about 165 feet above ground level and the aircraft began to drift above the glideslope and left of the runway centerline. The first officer reduced thrust to idle in an attempt to recapture the glideslope. The captain believed that the aircraft was not in position to make a safe landing and commanded a go-around. The aircraft stalled during the go-around, struck the runway and then veered off the right side of the runway. The aircraft then struck a ditch, a hill and some trees, and came to rest approximately 1,130 feet from the runway. The captain and eight passengers were seriously injured; the first officer, the flight attendant and the remaining 31 passengers sustained minor injuries or no injuries. The Transportation Safety Board of Canada in its final report on the accident, said that the aircraft stalled at an angle-of-attack approximately 4.5 degrees lower than normal, and that the premature stall was caused primarily by a thin accumulation of ice on the wing leading edges. Many factors were involved in this accident: the weather, darkness, flight-crew training and aircraft knowledge, aircraft handling, aircraft operating procedures, aircraft performance and limitations, Canadian Aviation Regulations, runway lighting, distribution of information, aircraft design and certification, and overview of operations. The weather, with a low ceiling and low visibility in fog, was the one factor that led to the interaction of all the other factors and, finally, to the accident.5. Which factor is not attributed to the accident?
On the night of Dec. 16, 1997, the crew of Air Canada Flight 646, a Canadair Regional Jet, conducted a Category I instrument landing system (ILS) approach to Runway 15 at the airport in Fredericton, New Brunswick, Canada. The ceiling and visibility were below the minimums published for the instrument approach. Nevertheless, the runway visual range on Runway 15 was 1,200 feet, and the crew was authorized by Canadian regulations to conduct the approach under these conditions. The captain saw the runway approach lights when the aircraft was 100 feet above decision height. The first officer, the pilot flying, disconnected the autopilot about 165 feet above ground level and the aircraft began to drift above the glideslope and left of the runway centerline. The first officer reduced thrust to idle in an attempt to recapture the glideslope. The captain believed that the aircraft was not in position to make a safe landing and commanded a go-around. The aircraft stalled during the go-around, struck the runway and then veered off the right side of the runway. The aircraft then struck a ditch, a hill and some trees, and came to rest approximately 1,130 feet from the runway. The captain and eight passengers were seriously injured; the first officer, the flight attendant and the remaining 31 passengers sustained minor injuries or no injuries. The Transportation Safety Board of Canada in its final report on the accident, said that the aircraft stalled at an angle-of-attack approximately 4.5 degrees lower than normal, and that the premature stall was caused primarily by a thin accumulation of ice on the wing leading edges. Many factors were involved in this accident: the weather, darkness, flight-crew training and aircraft knowledge, aircraft handling, aircraft operating procedures, aircraft performance and limitations, Canadian Aviation Regulations, runway lighting, distribution of information, aircraft design and certification, and overview of operations. The weather, with a low ceiling and low visibility in fog, was the one factor that led to the interaction of all the other factors and, finally, to the accident.4. What is the reason for the stall?
On the night of Dec. 16, 1997, the crew of Air Canada Flight 646, a Canadair Regional Jet, conducted a Category I instrument landing system (ILS) approach to Runway 15 at the airport in Fredericton, New Brunswick, Canada. The ceiling and visibility were below the minimums published for the instrument approach. Nevertheless, the runway visual range on Runway 15 was 1,200 feet, and the crew was authorized by Canadian regulations to conduct the approach under these conditions. The captain saw the runway approach lights when the aircraft was 100 feet above decision height. The first officer, the pilot flying, disconnected the autopilot about 165 feet above ground level and the aircraft began to drift above the glideslope and left of the runway centerline. The first officer reduced thrust to idle in an attempt to recapture the glideslope. The captain believed that the aircraft was not in position to make a safe landing and commanded a go-around. The aircraft stalled during the go-around, struck the runway and then veered off the right side of the runway. The aircraft then struck a ditch, a hill and some trees, and came to rest approximately 1,130 feet from the runway. The captain and eight passengers were seriously injured; the first officer, the flight attendant and the remaining 31 passengers sustained minor injuries or no injuries. The Transportation Safety Board of Canada in its final report on the accident, said that the aircraft stalled at an angle-of-attack approximately 4.5 degrees lower than normal, and that the premature stall was caused primarily by a thin accumulation of ice on the wing leading edges. Many factors were involved in this accident: the weather, darkness, flight-crew training and aircraft knowledge, aircraft handling, aircraft operating procedures, aircraft performance and limitations, Canadian Aviation Regulations, runway lighting, distribution of information, aircraft design and certification, and overview of operations. The weather, with a low ceiling and low visibility in fog, was the one factor that led to the interaction of all the other factors and, finally, to the accident.3. Which word has the same meaning as veer off in the third paragraph?
On the night of Dec. 16, 1997, the crew of Air Canada Flight 646, a Canadair Regional Jet, conducted a Category I instrument landing system (ILS) approach to Runway 15 at the airport in Fredericton, New Brunswick, Canada. The ceiling and visibility were below the minimums published for the instrument approach. Nevertheless, the runway visual range on Runway 15 was 1,200 feet, and the crew was authorized by Canadian regulations to conduct the approach under these conditions. The captain saw the runway approach lights when the aircraft was 100 feet above decision height. The first officer, the pilot flying, disconnected the autopilot about 165 feet above ground level and the aircraft began to drift above the glideslope and left of the runway centerline. The first officer reduced thrust to idle in an attempt to recapture the glideslope. The captain believed that the aircraft was not in position to make a safe landing and commanded a go-around. The aircraft stalled during the go-around, struck the runway and then veered off the right side of the runway. The aircraft then struck a ditch, a hill and some trees, and came to rest approximately 1,130 feet from the runway. The captain and eight passengers were seriously injured; the first officer, the flight attendant and the remaining 31 passengers sustained minor injuries or no injuries. The Transportation Safety Board of Canada in its final report on the accident, said that the aircraft stalled at an angle-of-attack approximately 4.5 degrees lower than normal, and that the premature stall was caused primarily by a thin accumulation of ice on the wing leading edges. Many factors were involved in this accident: the weather, darkness, flight-crew training and aircraft knowledge, aircraft handling, aircraft operating procedures, aircraft performance and limitations, Canadian Aviation Regulations, runway lighting, distribution of information, aircraft design and certification, and overview of operations. The weather, with a low ceiling and low visibility in fog, was the one factor that led to the interaction of all the other factors and, finally, to the accident.2. Who made the decision to go around?
On the night of Dec. 16, 1997, the crew of Air Canada Flight 646, a Canadair Regional Jet, conducted a Category I instrument landing system (ILS) approach to Runway 15 at the airport in Fredericton, New Brunswick, Canada. The ceiling and visibility were below the minimums published for the instrument approach. Nevertheless, the runway visual range on Runway 15 was 1,200 feet, and the crew was authorized by Canadian regulations to conduct the approach under these conditions. The captain saw the runway approach lights when the aircraft was 100 feet above decision height. The first officer, the pilot flying, disconnected the autopilot about 165 feet above ground level and the aircraft began to drift above the glideslope and left of the runway centerline. The first officer reduced thrust to idle in an attempt to recapture the glideslope. The captain believed that the aircraft was not in position to make a safe landing and commanded a go-around. The aircraft stalled during the go-around, struck the runway and then veered off the right side of the runway. The aircraft then struck a ditch, a hill and some trees, and came to rest approximately 1,130 feet from the runway. The captain and eight passengers were seriously injured; the first officer, the flight attendant and the remaining 31 passengers sustained minor injuries or no injuries. The Transportation Safety Board of Canada in its final report on the accident, said that the aircraft stalled at an angle-of-attack approximately 4.5 degrees lower than normal, and that the premature stall was caused primarily by a thin accumulation of ice on the wing leading edges. Many factors were involved in this accident: the weather, darkness, flight-crew training and aircraft knowledge, aircraft handling, aircraft operating procedures, aircraft performance and limitations, Canadian Aviation Regulations, runway lighting, distribution of information, aircraft design and certification, and overview of operations. The weather, with a low ceiling and low visibility in fog, was the one factor that led to the interaction of all the other factors and, finally, to the accident.1. What was the weather condition like when the accident happened?
Vertical situational awareness is your responsibility. If the Ground Proximity Warning System alert sounds, you must be prepared to execute an immediate pull up. Except in clear daylight visual conditions, the flight crew should immediately, and without hesitating to evaluate the warning, execute the pull up action recommended in their company’s procedure manual. Remember that the need to pull up or go around may occur for reasons other than terrain, such as an unstabilized approach, a high sink rate, improper configuration or deteriorating environmental conditions. It can also be driven by an unintentional error on the part of a controller or with the approach procedure design or other factors. In other words, you may be doing everything right from your point of view, but you may still get a pull up warning. It must not be ignored. Early generation GPWS sometimes gave false warnings and some flight crews became accustomed to ignoring the warnings leading to numerous CFIT accidents. Today, GPWS is extremely reliable due to enhancements in technology and advanced systems such as the Enhanced GPWS and the Terrain Awareness Warning System (TAWS) are even better. False warnings are highly unlikely with these new systems. The Flight Safety Foundation supports installation and usage of the newest technologies such as EGPWS and recommends that your fleet be updated to this type of equipment. As a pilot you should ensure that your operations are conducted with the most current version of the software for the system you are using. GPWS is designed to assist you by giving you warnings. Cautions given by the system require you to adjust the flight path. GLIDESLOPE, GLIDESLOPE Glideslope and bank angle for example. For extreme conditions these systems give warnings that you must react to immediately such as: Whoop, Whoop, PULL UP, Whoop, Whoop, PULL UP, Whoop, Whoop, PULL UP SINK RATE, SINK RATE, SINK RATE, SINK RATE When warnings do sound, the pilot not flying must be involved and assist the pilot flying. We＇re not stabilized, shouldn＇t we go around? Go Around!5. What does current version mean in Paragraph 9?
Vertical situational awareness is your responsibility. If the Ground Proximity Warning System alert sounds, you must be prepared to execute an immediate pull up. Except in clear daylight visual conditions, the flight crew should immediately, and without hesitating to evaluate the warning, execute the pull up action recommended in their company’s procedure manual. Remember that the need to pull up or go around may occur for reasons other than terrain, such as an unstabilized approach, a high sink rate, improper configuration or deteriorating environmental conditions. It can also be driven by an unintentional error on the part of a controller or with the approach procedure design or other factors. In other words, you may be doing everything right from your point of view, but you may still get a pull up warning. It must not be ignored. Early generation GPWS sometimes gave false warnings and some flight crews became accustomed to ignoring the warnings leading to numerous CFIT accidents. Today, GPWS is extremely reliable due to enhancements in technology and advanced systems such as the Enhanced GPWS and the Terrain Awareness Warning System (TAWS) are even better. False warnings are highly unlikely with these new systems. The Flight Safety Foundation supports installation and usage of the newest technologies such as EGPWS and recommends that your fleet be updated to this type of equipment. As a pilot you should ensure that your operations are conducted with the most current version of the software for the system you are using. GPWS is designed to assist you by giving you warnings. Cautions given by the system require you to adjust the flight path. GLIDESLOPE, GLIDESLOPE Glideslope and bank angle for example. For extreme conditions these systems give warnings that you must react to immediately such as: Whoop, Whoop, PULL UP, Whoop, Whoop, PULL UP, Whoop, Whoop, PULL UP SINK RATE, SINK RATE, SINK RATE, SINK RATE When warnings do sound, the pilot not flying must be involved and assist the pilot flying. We＇re not stabilized, shouldn＇t we go around? Go Around!4. According to the passage, which warning system is less reliable?
Vertical situational awareness is your responsibility. If the Ground Proximity Warning System alert sounds, you must be prepared to execute an immediate pull up. Except in clear daylight visual conditions, the flight crew should immediately, and without hesitating to evaluate the warning, execute the pull up action recommended in their company’s procedure manual. Remember that the need to pull up or go around may occur for reasons other than terrain, such as an unstabilized approach, a high sink rate, improper configuration or deteriorating environmental conditions. It can also be driven by an unintentional error on the part of a controller or with the approach procedure design or other factors. In other words, you may be doing everything right from your point of view, but you may still get a pull up warning. It must not be ignored. Early generation GPWS sometimes gave false warnings and some flight crews became accustomed to ignoring the warnings leading to numerous CFIT accidents. Today, GPWS is extremely reliable due to enhancements in technology and advanced systems such as the Enhanced GPWS and the Terrain Awareness Warning System (TAWS) are even better. False warnings are highly unlikely with these new systems. The Flight Safety Foundation supports installation and usage of the newest technologies such as EGPWS and recommends that your fleet be updated to this type of equipment. As a pilot you should ensure that your operations are conducted with the most current version of the software for the system you are using. GPWS is designed to assist you by giving you warnings. Cautions given by the system require you to adjust the flight path. GLIDESLOPE, GLIDESLOPE Glideslope and bank angle for example. For extreme conditions these systems give warnings that you must react to immediately such as: Whoop, Whoop, PULL UP, Whoop, Whoop, PULL UP, Whoop, Whoop, PULL UP SINK RATE, SINK RATE, SINK RATE, SINK RATE When warnings do sound, the pilot not flying must be involved and assist the pilot flying. We＇re not stabilized, shouldn＇t we go around? Go Around!3. What should the pilot do when GPWS is alerted?
Vertical situational awareness is your responsibility. If the Ground Proximity Warning System alert sounds, you must be prepared to execute an immediate pull up. Except in clear daylight visual conditions, the flight crew should immediately, and without hesitating to evaluate the warning, execute the pull up action recommended in their company’s procedure manual. Remember that the need to pull up or go around may occur for reasons other than terrain, such as an unstabilized approach, a high sink rate, improper configuration or deteriorating environmental conditions. It can also be driven by an unintentional error on the part of a controller or with the approach procedure design or other factors. In other words, you may be doing everything right from your point of view, but you may still get a pull up warning. It must not be ignored. Early generation GPWS sometimes gave false warnings and some flight crews became accustomed to ignoring the warnings leading to numerous CFIT accidents. Today, GPWS is extremely reliable due to enhancements in technology and advanced systems such as the Enhanced GPWS and the Terrain Awareness Warning System (TAWS) are even better. False warnings are highly unlikely with these new systems. The Flight Safety Foundation supports installation and usage of the newest technologies such as EGPWS and recommends that your fleet be updated to this type of equipment. As a pilot you should ensure that your operations are conducted with the most current version of the software for the system you are using. GPWS is designed to assist you by giving you warnings. Cautions given by the system require you to adjust the flight path. GLIDESLOPE, GLIDESLOPE Glideslope and bank angle for example. For extreme conditions these systems give warnings that you must react to immediately such as: Whoop, Whoop, PULL UP, Whoop, Whoop, PULL UP, Whoop, Whoop, PULL UP SINK RATE, SINK RATE, SINK RATE, SINK RATE When warnings do sound, the pilot not flying must be involved and assist the pilot flying. We＇re not stabilized, shouldn＇t we go around? Go Around!2. What is not the reason for numerous CFIT accidents?
Vertical situational awareness is your responsibility. If the Ground Proximity Warning System alert sounds, you must be prepared to execute an immediate pull up. Except in clear daylight visual conditions, the flight crew should immediately, and without hesitating to evaluate the warning, execute the pull up action recommended in their company’s procedure manual. Remember that the need to pull up or go around may occur for reasons other than terrain, such as an unstabilized approach, a high sink rate, improper configuration or deteriorating environmental conditions. It can also be driven by an unintentional error on the part of a controller or with the approach procedure design or other factors. In other words, you may be doing everything right from your point of view, but you may still get a pull up warning. It must not be ignored. Early generation GPWS sometimes gave false warnings and some flight crews became accustomed to ignoring the warnings leading to numerous CFIT accidents. Today, GPWS is extremely reliable due to enhancements in technology and advanced systems such as the Enhanced GPWS and the Terrain Awareness Warning System (TAWS) are even better. False warnings are highly unlikely with these new systems. The Flight Safety Foundation supports installation and usage of the newest technologies such as EGPWS and recommends that your fleet be updated to this type of equipment. As a pilot you should ensure that your operations are conducted with the most current version of the software for the system you are using. GPWS is designed to assist you by giving you warnings. Cautions given by the system require you to adjust the flight path. GLIDESLOPE, GLIDESLOPE Glideslope and bank angle for example. For extreme conditions these systems give warnings that you must react to immediately such as: Whoop, Whoop, PULL UP, Whoop, Whoop, PULL UP, Whoop, Whoop, PULL UP SINK RATE, SINK RATE, SINK RATE, SINK RATE When warnings do sound, the pilot not flying must be involved and assist the pilot flying. We＇re not stabilized, shouldn＇t we go around? Go Around!1. According to the passage, what will an unstabilized approach result in?
