相关题目
Nowhere else is the communication process more important than in the cockpit of an aircraft. As history has repeatedly shown, a breakdown in the communication process often leads to less than desirable events that can be illustrated as follows: ● In 1977, at Tenerife in the Canary Islands, heavy accents and improper terminology among a Dutch KLM crew, an American Pan Am crew and a Spanish air traffic controller led to the worst aviation disaster in history, in which 583 passengers perished. ● In 1980, another Spanish air traffic controller at Tenerife gave a holding pattern clearance to a Dan Air flight by saying turn to the left when he should have said turns to the left - resulting in the aircraft making a single left turn rather than making circles using left turns. The jet hit a mountain killing 146 people. ● In 1990, Colombian Avianca pilots in a holding pattern over Kennedy Airport told controllers that their 707 was low on fuel. The crew should have stated they had a fuel emergency, which would have given them immediate clearance to land. Instead, the crew declared a minimum fuel condition and the plane ran out of fuel, crashing and killing 72 people. ● In 1993, Chinese pilots flying a U.S.-made MD-80 were attempting to land in northwest China. The pilots were baffled by an audio alarm from the plane＇s ground proximity warning system. A cockpit recorder picked up the pilot＇s last words: What does ＇pull up＇ mean? ● In 1995, an American Airlines jet crashed into a mountain in Colombia after the captain instructed the autopilot to steer towards the wrong beacon. A controller later stated that he suspected from the pilot＇s communications that the jet was in trouble, but that the controller＇s English was not sufficient for him to understand and articulate the problem. ● On November 13, 1996, a Saudi Arabian airliner and a Kazakhstan plane collided in mid-air near New Delhi, India. While an investigation is still pending, early indications are that the Kazak pilot may not have been sufficiently fluent in English and was consequently unable to understand an Indian controller giving instructions in English. (Aviation Today: Special Reports, 2004) All of the above examples are the result of language barriers. But, barriers to effective communication can come in other forms as well, including noise, vibration, radio clutter, distractions, and even cultural differences between crew members. This list is not all-inclusive, but does depict some of the more common problems in today＇s cockpits.1. What was the Tenerife airport controller’s intention when saying turns to the left to the Dan Air flight?
On the night of Dec. 16, 1997, the crew of Air Canada Flight 646, a Canadair Regional Jet, conducted a Category I instrument landing system (ILS) approach to Runway 15 at the airport in Fredericton, New Brunswick, Canada. The ceiling and visibility were below the minimums published for the instrument approach. Nevertheless, the runway visual range on Runway 15 was 1,200 feet, and the crew was authorized by Canadian regulations to conduct the approach under these conditions. The captain saw the runway approach lights when the aircraft was 100 feet above decision height. The first officer, the pilot flying, disconnected the autopilot about 165 feet above ground level and the aircraft began to drift above the glideslope and left of the runway centerline. The first officer reduced thrust to idle in an attempt to recapture the glideslope. The captain believed that the aircraft was not in position to make a safe landing and commanded a go-around. The aircraft stalled during the go-around, struck the runway and then veered off the right side of the runway. The aircraft then struck a ditch, a hill and some trees, and came to rest approximately 1,130 feet from the runway. The captain and eight passengers were seriously injured; the first officer, the flight attendant and the remaining 31 passengers sustained minor injuries or no injuries. The Transportation Safety Board of Canada in its final report on the accident, said that the aircraft stalled at an angle-of-attack approximately 4.5 degrees lower than normal, and that the premature stall was caused primarily by a thin accumulation of ice on the wing leading edges. Many factors were involved in this accident: the weather, darkness, flight-crew training and aircraft knowledge, aircraft handling, aircraft operating procedures, aircraft performance and limitations, Canadian Aviation Regulations, runway lighting, distribution of information, aircraft design and certification, and overview of operations. The weather, with a low ceiling and low visibility in fog, was the one factor that led to the interaction of all the other factors and, finally, to the accident.5. Which factor is not attributed to the accident?
On the night of Dec. 16, 1997, the crew of Air Canada Flight 646, a Canadair Regional Jet, conducted a Category I instrument landing system (ILS) approach to Runway 15 at the airport in Fredericton, New Brunswick, Canada. The ceiling and visibility were below the minimums published for the instrument approach. Nevertheless, the runway visual range on Runway 15 was 1,200 feet, and the crew was authorized by Canadian regulations to conduct the approach under these conditions. The captain saw the runway approach lights when the aircraft was 100 feet above decision height. The first officer, the pilot flying, disconnected the autopilot about 165 feet above ground level and the aircraft began to drift above the glideslope and left of the runway centerline. The first officer reduced thrust to idle in an attempt to recapture the glideslope. The captain believed that the aircraft was not in position to make a safe landing and commanded a go-around. The aircraft stalled during the go-around, struck the runway and then veered off the right side of the runway. The aircraft then struck a ditch, a hill and some trees, and came to rest approximately 1,130 feet from the runway. The captain and eight passengers were seriously injured; the first officer, the flight attendant and the remaining 31 passengers sustained minor injuries or no injuries. The Transportation Safety Board of Canada in its final report on the accident, said that the aircraft stalled at an angle-of-attack approximately 4.5 degrees lower than normal, and that the premature stall was caused primarily by a thin accumulation of ice on the wing leading edges. Many factors were involved in this accident: the weather, darkness, flight-crew training and aircraft knowledge, aircraft handling, aircraft operating procedures, aircraft performance and limitations, Canadian Aviation Regulations, runway lighting, distribution of information, aircraft design and certification, and overview of operations. The weather, with a low ceiling and low visibility in fog, was the one factor that led to the interaction of all the other factors and, finally, to the accident.4. What is the reason for the stall?
On the night of Dec. 16, 1997, the crew of Air Canada Flight 646, a Canadair Regional Jet, conducted a Category I instrument landing system (ILS) approach to Runway 15 at the airport in Fredericton, New Brunswick, Canada. The ceiling and visibility were below the minimums published for the instrument approach. Nevertheless, the runway visual range on Runway 15 was 1,200 feet, and the crew was authorized by Canadian regulations to conduct the approach under these conditions. The captain saw the runway approach lights when the aircraft was 100 feet above decision height. The first officer, the pilot flying, disconnected the autopilot about 165 feet above ground level and the aircraft began to drift above the glideslope and left of the runway centerline. The first officer reduced thrust to idle in an attempt to recapture the glideslope. The captain believed that the aircraft was not in position to make a safe landing and commanded a go-around. The aircraft stalled during the go-around, struck the runway and then veered off the right side of the runway. The aircraft then struck a ditch, a hill and some trees, and came to rest approximately 1,130 feet from the runway. The captain and eight passengers were seriously injured; the first officer, the flight attendant and the remaining 31 passengers sustained minor injuries or no injuries. The Transportation Safety Board of Canada in its final report on the accident, said that the aircraft stalled at an angle-of-attack approximately 4.5 degrees lower than normal, and that the premature stall was caused primarily by a thin accumulation of ice on the wing leading edges. Many factors were involved in this accident: the weather, darkness, flight-crew training and aircraft knowledge, aircraft handling, aircraft operating procedures, aircraft performance and limitations, Canadian Aviation Regulations, runway lighting, distribution of information, aircraft design and certification, and overview of operations. The weather, with a low ceiling and low visibility in fog, was the one factor that led to the interaction of all the other factors and, finally, to the accident.3. Which word has the same meaning as veer off in the third paragraph?
On the night of Dec. 16, 1997, the crew of Air Canada Flight 646, a Canadair Regional Jet, conducted a Category I instrument landing system (ILS) approach to Runway 15 at the airport in Fredericton, New Brunswick, Canada. The ceiling and visibility were below the minimums published for the instrument approach. Nevertheless, the runway visual range on Runway 15 was 1,200 feet, and the crew was authorized by Canadian regulations to conduct the approach under these conditions. The captain saw the runway approach lights when the aircraft was 100 feet above decision height. The first officer, the pilot flying, disconnected the autopilot about 165 feet above ground level and the aircraft began to drift above the glideslope and left of the runway centerline. The first officer reduced thrust to idle in an attempt to recapture the glideslope. The captain believed that the aircraft was not in position to make a safe landing and commanded a go-around. The aircraft stalled during the go-around, struck the runway and then veered off the right side of the runway. The aircraft then struck a ditch, a hill and some trees, and came to rest approximately 1,130 feet from the runway. The captain and eight passengers were seriously injured; the first officer, the flight attendant and the remaining 31 passengers sustained minor injuries or no injuries. The Transportation Safety Board of Canada in its final report on the accident, said that the aircraft stalled at an angle-of-attack approximately 4.5 degrees lower than normal, and that the premature stall was caused primarily by a thin accumulation of ice on the wing leading edges. Many factors were involved in this accident: the weather, darkness, flight-crew training and aircraft knowledge, aircraft handling, aircraft operating procedures, aircraft performance and limitations, Canadian Aviation Regulations, runway lighting, distribution of information, aircraft design and certification, and overview of operations. The weather, with a low ceiling and low visibility in fog, was the one factor that led to the interaction of all the other factors and, finally, to the accident.2. Who made the decision to go around?
On the night of Dec. 16, 1997, the crew of Air Canada Flight 646, a Canadair Regional Jet, conducted a Category I instrument landing system (ILS) approach to Runway 15 at the airport in Fredericton, New Brunswick, Canada. The ceiling and visibility were below the minimums published for the instrument approach. Nevertheless, the runway visual range on Runway 15 was 1,200 feet, and the crew was authorized by Canadian regulations to conduct the approach under these conditions. The captain saw the runway approach lights when the aircraft was 100 feet above decision height. The first officer, the pilot flying, disconnected the autopilot about 165 feet above ground level and the aircraft began to drift above the glideslope and left of the runway centerline. The first officer reduced thrust to idle in an attempt to recapture the glideslope. The captain believed that the aircraft was not in position to make a safe landing and commanded a go-around. The aircraft stalled during the go-around, struck the runway and then veered off the right side of the runway. The aircraft then struck a ditch, a hill and some trees, and came to rest approximately 1,130 feet from the runway. The captain and eight passengers were seriously injured; the first officer, the flight attendant and the remaining 31 passengers sustained minor injuries or no injuries. The Transportation Safety Board of Canada in its final report on the accident, said that the aircraft stalled at an angle-of-attack approximately 4.5 degrees lower than normal, and that the premature stall was caused primarily by a thin accumulation of ice on the wing leading edges. Many factors were involved in this accident: the weather, darkness, flight-crew training and aircraft knowledge, aircraft handling, aircraft operating procedures, aircraft performance and limitations, Canadian Aviation Regulations, runway lighting, distribution of information, aircraft design and certification, and overview of operations. The weather, with a low ceiling and low visibility in fog, was the one factor that led to the interaction of all the other factors and, finally, to the accident.1. What was the weather condition like when the accident happened?
Vertical situational awareness is your responsibility. If the Ground Proximity Warning System alert sounds, you must be prepared to execute an immediate pull up. Except in clear daylight visual conditions, the flight crew should immediately, and without hesitating to evaluate the warning, execute the pull up action recommended in their company’s procedure manual. Remember that the need to pull up or go around may occur for reasons other than terrain, such as an unstabilized approach, a high sink rate, improper configuration or deteriorating environmental conditions. It can also be driven by an unintentional error on the part of a controller or with the approach procedure design or other factors. In other words, you may be doing everything right from your point of view, but you may still get a pull up warning. It must not be ignored. Early generation GPWS sometimes gave false warnings and some flight crews became accustomed to ignoring the warnings leading to numerous CFIT accidents. Today, GPWS is extremely reliable due to enhancements in technology and advanced systems such as the Enhanced GPWS and the Terrain Awareness Warning System (TAWS) are even better. False warnings are highly unlikely with these new systems. The Flight Safety Foundation supports installation and usage of the newest technologies such as EGPWS and recommends that your fleet be updated to this type of equipment. As a pilot you should ensure that your operations are conducted with the most current version of the software for the system you are using. GPWS is designed to assist you by giving you warnings. Cautions given by the system require you to adjust the flight path. GLIDESLOPE, GLIDESLOPE Glideslope and bank angle for example. For extreme conditions these systems give warnings that you must react to immediately such as: Whoop, Whoop, PULL UP, Whoop, Whoop, PULL UP, Whoop, Whoop, PULL UP SINK RATE, SINK RATE, SINK RATE, SINK RATE When warnings do sound, the pilot not flying must be involved and assist the pilot flying. We＇re not stabilized, shouldn＇t we go around? Go Around!5. What does current version mean in Paragraph 9?
Vertical situational awareness is your responsibility. If the Ground Proximity Warning System alert sounds, you must be prepared to execute an immediate pull up. Except in clear daylight visual conditions, the flight crew should immediately, and without hesitating to evaluate the warning, execute the pull up action recommended in their company’s procedure manual. Remember that the need to pull up or go around may occur for reasons other than terrain, such as an unstabilized approach, a high sink rate, improper configuration or deteriorating environmental conditions. It can also be driven by an unintentional error on the part of a controller or with the approach procedure design or other factors. In other words, you may be doing everything right from your point of view, but you may still get a pull up warning. It must not be ignored. Early generation GPWS sometimes gave false warnings and some flight crews became accustomed to ignoring the warnings leading to numerous CFIT accidents. Today, GPWS is extremely reliable due to enhancements in technology and advanced systems such as the Enhanced GPWS and the Terrain Awareness Warning System (TAWS) are even better. False warnings are highly unlikely with these new systems. The Flight Safety Foundation supports installation and usage of the newest technologies such as EGPWS and recommends that your fleet be updated to this type of equipment. As a pilot you should ensure that your operations are conducted with the most current version of the software for the system you are using. GPWS is designed to assist you by giving you warnings. Cautions given by the system require you to adjust the flight path. GLIDESLOPE, GLIDESLOPE Glideslope and bank angle for example. For extreme conditions these systems give warnings that you must react to immediately such as: Whoop, Whoop, PULL UP, Whoop, Whoop, PULL UP, Whoop, Whoop, PULL UP SINK RATE, SINK RATE, SINK RATE, SINK RATE When warnings do sound, the pilot not flying must be involved and assist the pilot flying. We＇re not stabilized, shouldn＇t we go around? Go Around!4. According to the passage, which warning system is less reliable?
Vertical situational awareness is your responsibility. If the Ground Proximity Warning System alert sounds, you must be prepared to execute an immediate pull up. Except in clear daylight visual conditions, the flight crew should immediately, and without hesitating to evaluate the warning, execute the pull up action recommended in their company’s procedure manual. Remember that the need to pull up or go around may occur for reasons other than terrain, such as an unstabilized approach, a high sink rate, improper configuration or deteriorating environmental conditions. It can also be driven by an unintentional error on the part of a controller or with the approach procedure design or other factors. In other words, you may be doing everything right from your point of view, but you may still get a pull up warning. It must not be ignored. Early generation GPWS sometimes gave false warnings and some flight crews became accustomed to ignoring the warnings leading to numerous CFIT accidents. Today, GPWS is extremely reliable due to enhancements in technology and advanced systems such as the Enhanced GPWS and the Terrain Awareness Warning System (TAWS) are even better. False warnings are highly unlikely with these new systems. The Flight Safety Foundation supports installation and usage of the newest technologies such as EGPWS and recommends that your fleet be updated to this type of equipment. As a pilot you should ensure that your operations are conducted with the most current version of the software for the system you are using. GPWS is designed to assist you by giving you warnings. Cautions given by the system require you to adjust the flight path. GLIDESLOPE, GLIDESLOPE Glideslope and bank angle for example. For extreme conditions these systems give warnings that you must react to immediately such as: Whoop, Whoop, PULL UP, Whoop, Whoop, PULL UP, Whoop, Whoop, PULL UP SINK RATE, SINK RATE, SINK RATE, SINK RATE When warnings do sound, the pilot not flying must be involved and assist the pilot flying. We＇re not stabilized, shouldn＇t we go around? Go Around!3. What should the pilot do when GPWS is alerted?
Vertical situational awareness is your responsibility. If the Ground Proximity Warning System alert sounds, you must be prepared to execute an immediate pull up. Except in clear daylight visual conditions, the flight crew should immediately, and without hesitating to evaluate the warning, execute the pull up action recommended in their company’s procedure manual. Remember that the need to pull up or go around may occur for reasons other than terrain, such as an unstabilized approach, a high sink rate, improper configuration or deteriorating environmental conditions. It can also be driven by an unintentional error on the part of a controller or with the approach procedure design or other factors. In other words, you may be doing everything right from your point of view, but you may still get a pull up warning. It must not be ignored. Early generation GPWS sometimes gave false warnings and some flight crews became accustomed to ignoring the warnings leading to numerous CFIT accidents. Today, GPWS is extremely reliable due to enhancements in technology and advanced systems such as the Enhanced GPWS and the Terrain Awareness Warning System (TAWS) are even better. False warnings are highly unlikely with these new systems. The Flight Safety Foundation supports installation and usage of the newest technologies such as EGPWS and recommends that your fleet be updated to this type of equipment. As a pilot you should ensure that your operations are conducted with the most current version of the software for the system you are using. GPWS is designed to assist you by giving you warnings. Cautions given by the system require you to adjust the flight path. GLIDESLOPE, GLIDESLOPE Glideslope and bank angle for example. For extreme conditions these systems give warnings that you must react to immediately such as: Whoop, Whoop, PULL UP, Whoop, Whoop, PULL UP, Whoop, Whoop, PULL UP SINK RATE, SINK RATE, SINK RATE, SINK RATE When warnings do sound, the pilot not flying must be involved and assist the pilot flying. We＇re not stabilized, shouldn＇t we go around? Go Around!2. What is not the reason for numerous CFIT accidents?
