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The runway incursion issue has been on the Board＇s Most Wanted List since its inception in 1990. In the late 1980s, an inordinate number of runway incursions/ground collision accidents resulted in substantial loss of life and the Safety Board issued numerous safety recommendations addressing the issue. The FAA completed action on a number of important objectives to make the ground operation of aircraft safer. However, these incidents continue to occur with alarming frequency. The FAA indicates that during fiscal year 2004 there were 326 incursion incidents, and that during fiscal year 2005 (ending September 30, 2005), there were 324 occurrences. The system the FAA is currently deploying to prevent runway collisions requires a controller to: ·5 Determine the nature of the problem ·Determine the location ·Identify the aircraft involved ·Determine what action to take ·Issue appropriate warnings or instruction The flight crew must then respond to the situation and take action. Simulations of the FAA＇s airport movement area safety system (AMASS) performance using data from actual incursions show that alerts may occur as little as 8 to 11 seconds before a potential collision—providing no margin for error. In three recent incidents (2005)—at Boston in June, New York in July, and Las Vegas in September—AMASS did not alert controllers in time to be effective. In the incident at Boston Logan International Airport, an Aer Lingus A330 and a US Airways 737 came within 171 feet of each other on an intersecting runway after both were cleared for takeoff. The 737 pilot, who saw the potential hazard, pushed the control column forward keeping the aircraft on the ground while the Airbus passed overhead. The 737 took off farther down the runway. In the incident at JFK International Airport, New York, there was a near collision between an Israir 767 and an Airborne Express DC-8 cargo plane. The passenger jet entered a runway on which the cargo plane was on its takeoff roll. It is estimated that the cargo plane cleared the 767 by about 100 feet as it took off over the 767. In the incident at Las Vegas International Airport, there was a near collision between an Air Canada A319, which had just landed, and an America West A320, which was cleared to take off. The controller confused two departure aircraft; that resulted in Air Canada being cleared to cross a runway as the other jet was taking off. The America West pilot reported that he was 100 feet above Air Canada as he passed over it. Until there is a system in place to positively control ground movements of all aircraft, with direct warning to pilots, the potential for this type of disaster will continue to be high.2. In the incident at Boston Logan International Airport, an Aer Lingus A330 and a US Airways 737 came within 171 feet of each other on an intersecting runway（ ）.
The runway incursion issue has been on the Board＇s Most Wanted List since its inception in 1990. In the late 1980s, an inordinate number of runway incursions/ground collision accidents resulted in substantial loss of life and the Safety Board issued numerous safety recommendations addressing the issue. The FAA completed action on a number of important objectives to make the ground operation of aircraft safer. However, these incidents continue to occur with alarming frequency. The FAA indicates that during fiscal year 2004 there were 326 incursion incidents, and that during fiscal year 2005 (ending September 30, 2005), there were 324 occurrences. The system the FAA is currently deploying to prevent runway collisions requires a controller to: ·5 Determine the nature of the problem ·Determine the location ·Identify the aircraft involved ·Determine what action to take ·Issue appropriate warnings or instruction The flight crew must then respond to the situation and take action. Simulations of the FAA＇s airport movement area safety system (AMASS) performance using data from actual incursions show that alerts may occur as little as 8 to 11 seconds before a potential collision—providing no margin for error. In three recent incidents (2005)—at Boston in June, New York in July, and Las Vegas in September—AMASS did not alert controllers in time to be effective. In the incident at Boston Logan International Airport, an Aer Lingus A330 and a US Airways 737 came within 171 feet of each other on an intersecting runway after both were cleared for takeoff. The 737 pilot, who saw the potential hazard, pushed the control column forward keeping the aircraft on the ground while the Airbus passed overhead. The 737 took off farther down the runway. In the incident at JFK International Airport, New York, there was a near collision between an Israir 767 and an Airborne Express DC-8 cargo plane. The passenger jet entered a runway on which the cargo plane was on its takeoff roll. It is estimated that the cargo plane cleared the 767 by about 100 feet as it took off over the 767. In the incident at Las Vegas International Airport, there was a near collision between an Air Canada A319, which had just landed, and an America West A320, which was cleared to take off. The controller confused two departure aircraft; that resulted in Air Canada being cleared to cross a runway as the other jet was taking off. The America West pilot reported that he was 100 feet above Air Canada as he passed over it. Until there is a system in place to positively control ground movements of all aircraft, with direct warning to pilots, the potential for this type of disaster will continue to be high.1.The FAA indicates that during fiscal year 2004 there were incursion incidents.
The International Civil Aviation Organization defines a runway incursion as any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and take off of aircraft. This might be boiled down to incorrect presence on a runway. The Federal Aviation Administration defines a runway incursion as any occurrence in the airport runway environment involving an aircraft, vehicle, person or object on the ground that creates a collision hazard or results in a loss of required separation with an aircraft taking off, intending to take off, landing, or intending to land. Airservices Australia defines a runway incursion as unauthorized entry to an active runway strip by an aircraft, person, animal, vehicle or equipment. The slight differences in definitions may result in differences in numbers of reported incursions; and some harmonization or standardization in the near future is to be hoped for. EuroControl Statistical Reference Area (ERSA) has the following data for the number of runway incursions per million flights: In 1998, the rate of reported incursions was 3 per million flights. That doubled to a rate of six per million flights in 1999, and went of to 10 per million flights in the year 2000. 2001 saw a big jump to a rate of 23 reported incursions per million flights, a number which decreased slightly to 21 per million flights in 2002. For 2003, the last year for which complete data was available, the rate of incursions jumped again to 40 per million flights. These numbers are troubling. Several organizations, including the FAA and EuroControl had similar data on the major cause of reported runway incursions: Pilot Error was determined to be the cause in 51 percent of all reported runway incursions. Vehicle or Pedestrian Error was determined to be the cause in 29 percent of reported incursions. Controller error was determined to be the cause in 20 percent of reported incursions. EuroControl also classified several years of runway incursion reports according to seriousness. Their data was similar to FAA data using a similar classification: About 31% of reported incursions were classified as having No Risk. Another 34% were deemed to involve Some Risk. 30% were classified as having Significant Risk. That totals 95%. The other 5% of reported Incursions were classified as being Extremely Hazardous.5. It is mentioned that EuroControl classified several years of runway incursion reports according to（ ）.
The International Civil Aviation Organization defines a runway incursion as any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and take off of aircraft. This might be boiled down to incorrect presence on a runway. The Federal Aviation Administration defines a runway incursion as any occurrence in the airport runway environment involving an aircraft, vehicle, person or object on the ground that creates a collision hazard or results in a loss of required separation with an aircraft taking off, intending to take off, landing, or intending to land. Airservices Australia defines a runway incursion as unauthorized entry to an active runway strip by an aircraft, person, animal, vehicle or equipment. The slight differences in definitions may result in differences in numbers of reported incursions; and some harmonization or standardization in the near future is to be hoped for. EuroControl Statistical Reference Area (ERSA) has the following data for the number of runway incursions per million flights: In 1998, the rate of reported incursions was 3 per million flights. That doubled to a rate of six per million flights in 1999, and went of to 10 per million flights in the year 2000. 2001 saw a big jump to a rate of 23 reported incursions per million flights, a number which decreased slightly to 21 per million flights in 2002. For 2003, the last year for which complete data was available, the rate of incursions jumped again to 40 per million flights. These numbers are troubling. Several organizations, including the FAA and EuroControl had similar data on the major cause of reported runway incursions: Pilot Error was determined to be the cause in 51 percent of all reported runway incursions. Vehicle or Pedestrian Error was determined to be the cause in 29 percent of reported incursions. Controller error was determined to be the cause in 20 percent of reported incursions. EuroControl also classified several years of runway incursion reports according to seriousness. Their data was similar to FAA data using a similar classification: About 31% of reported incursions were classified as having No Risk. Another 34% were deemed to involve Some Risk. 30% were classified as having Significant Risk. That totals 95%. The other 5% of reported Incursions were classified as being Extremely Hazardous.4. The slight differences in definitions of runway incursion may result in （ ）.
The International Civil Aviation Organization defines a runway incursion as any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and take off of aircraft. This might be boiled down to incorrect presence on a runway. The Federal Aviation Administration defines a runway incursion as any occurrence in the airport runway environment involving an aircraft, vehicle, person or object on the ground that creates a collision hazard or results in a loss of required separation with an aircraft taking off, intending to take off, landing, or intending to land. Airservices Australia defines a runway incursion as unauthorized entry to an active runway strip by an aircraft, person, animal, vehicle or equipment. The slight differences in definitions may result in differences in numbers of reported incursions; and some harmonization or standardization in the near future is to be hoped for. EuroControl Statistical Reference Area (ERSA) has the following data for the number of runway incursions per million flights: In 1998, the rate of reported incursions was 3 per million flights. That doubled to a rate of six per million flights in 1999, and went of to 10 per million flights in the year 2000. 2001 saw a big jump to a rate of 23 reported incursions per million flights, a number which decreased slightly to 21 per million flights in 2002. For 2003, the last year for which complete data was available, the rate of incursions jumped again to 40 per million flights. These numbers are troubling. Several organizations, including the FAA and EuroControl had similar data on the major cause of reported runway incursions: Pilot Error was determined to be the cause in 51 percent of all reported runway incursions. Vehicle or Pedestrian Error was determined to be the cause in 29 percent of reported incursions. Controller error was determined to be the cause in 20 percent of reported incursions. EuroControl also classified several years of runway incursion reports according to seriousness. Their data was similar to FAA data using a similar classification: About 31% of reported incursions were classified as having No Risk. Another 34% were deemed to involve Some Risk. 30% were classified as having Significant Risk. That totals 95%. The other 5% of reported Incursions were classified as being Extremely Hazardous.3. （ ） of the reported runway incursions were viewed as being Significantly Hazardous.
The International Civil Aviation Organization defines a runway incursion as any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and take off of aircraft. This might be boiled down to incorrect presence on a runway. The Federal Aviation Administration defines a runway incursion as any occurrence in the airport runway environment involving an aircraft, vehicle, person or object on the ground that creates a collision hazard or results in a loss of required separation with an aircraft taking off, intending to take off, landing, or intending to land. Airservices Australia defines a runway incursion as unauthorized entry to an active runway strip by an aircraft, person, animal, vehicle or equipment. The slight differences in definitions may result in differences in numbers of reported incursions; and some harmonization or standardization in the near future is to be hoped for. EuroControl Statistical Reference Area (ERSA) has the following data for the number of runway incursions per million flights: In 1998, the rate of reported incursions was 3 per million flights. That doubled to a rate of six per million flights in 1999, and went of to 10 per million flights in the year 2000. 2001 saw a big jump to a rate of 23 reported incursions per million flights, a number which decreased slightly to 21 per million flights in 2002. For 2003, the last year for which complete data was available, the rate of incursions jumped again to 40 per million flights. These numbers are troubling. Several organizations, including the FAA and EuroControl had similar data on the major cause of reported runway incursions: Pilot Error was determined to be the cause in 51 percent of all reported runway incursions. Vehicle or Pedestrian Error was determined to be the cause in 29 percent of reported incursions. Controller error was determined to be the cause in 20 percent of reported incursions. EuroControl also classified several years of runway incursion reports according to seriousness. Their data was similar to FAA data using a similar classification: About 31% of reported incursions were classified as having No Risk. Another 34% were deemed to involve Some Risk. 30% were classified as having Significant Risk. That totals 95%. The other 5% of reported Incursions were classified as being Extremely Hazardous.2. （ ） was determined to be the most important cause of all reported runway incursions.
The International Civil Aviation Organization defines a runway incursion as any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and take off of aircraft. This might be boiled down to incorrect presence on a runway. The Federal Aviation Administration defines a runway incursion as any occurrence in the airport runway environment involving an aircraft, vehicle, person or object on the ground that creates a collision hazard or results in a loss of required separation with an aircraft taking off, intending to take off, landing, or intending to land. Airservices Australia defines a runway incursion as unauthorized entry to an active runway strip by an aircraft, person, animal, vehicle or equipment. The slight differences in definitions may result in differences in numbers of reported incursions; and some harmonization or standardization in the near future is to be hoped for. EuroControl Statistical Reference Area (ERSA) has the following data for the number of runway incursions per million flights: In 1998, the rate of reported incursions was 3 per million flights. That doubled to a rate of six per million flights in 1999, and went of to 10 per million flights in the year 2000. 2001 saw a big jump to a rate of 23 reported incursions per million flights, a number which decreased slightly to 21 per million flights in 2002. For 2003, the last year for which complete data was available, the rate of incursions jumped again to 40 per million flights. These numbers are troubling. Several organizations, including the FAA and EuroControl had similar data on the major cause of reported runway incursions: Pilot Error was determined to be the cause in 51 percent of all reported runway incursions. Vehicle or Pedestrian Error was determined to be the cause in 29 percent of reported incursions. Controller error was determined to be the cause in 20 percent of reported incursions. EuroControl also classified several years of runway incursion reports according to seriousness. Their data was similar to FAA data using a similar classification: About 31% of reported incursions were classified as having No Risk. Another 34% were deemed to involve Some Risk. 30% were classified as having Significant Risk. That totals 95%. The other 5% of reported Incursions were classified as being Extremely Hazardous.1. The rate of reported runway incursions per million flights in 1999 was （ ）.
Situational Awareness–or SA as human factors specialists like to call it–is a term referring to pilots’ ability to keep the big picture in flight operations. This includes awareness of the aircraft’s location and attitude, its proximity to physical hazards and obstructions, weather and environmental factors, engine and systems status, task priority within the cockpit, and many other factors. Loss of situational awareness is often associated with poor weather, aircraft emergencies and other extreme situations. But more insidiously, loss of situational awareness also occurs in good visual conditions during routine operations. An air carrier Captain describes a case in point: While being vectored on a downwind leg to Runway 01L, Tower asked if we had the field in sight, which we did. At that time we were cleared for a visual approach to Runway 01L and a left turn back to the field was initiated to result in a final of approximately 6 miles. When approximately 60° from the runway heading, Tower reported traffic (a B-757) joining a final for runway 01R. While looking for the traffic the First Officer, who was flying the aircraft, took his eyes off the field and shallowed his bank... When I realized he was not just squaring off his final but was going to overshoot the runway I told him he was going to overshoot and ordered a turn back to our runway. He seemed disoriented and was slow in responding, resulting in a significant overshoot approaching the approach corridor for Runway 01R. A TCAS II-Resolution Advisory resulted with a monitor vertical speed command which was complied with. Tower questioned if we had the traffic in sight which we answered in the affirmative. We corrected back to the 01L centerline and landed with no further incident. In talking to the First Officer after the landing, he indicated that he lost sight of the runway in the left turn. Also that he never actually saw the B-757. Although I indicated that I saw the traffic and pointed it out, the First Officer did not see it, but I assumed he did. I also assumed that he had the runway in sight, so I was unaware that he had lost situational awareness. The lesson to me is to never assume another crew member is seeing the same thing I am and to work to communicate what I am seeing even when weather is good and easy visual approaches are being conducted. We trust this incident taught the First Officer the importance of communicating clearly with other crew when he does not have other traffic and the runway in sight.5. This incident is caused by?
Situational Awareness–or SA as human factors specialists like to call it–is a term referring to pilots’ ability to keep the big picture in flight operations. This includes awareness of the aircraft’s location and attitude, its proximity to physical hazards and obstructions, weather and environmental factors, engine and systems status, task priority within the cockpit, and many other factors. Loss of situational awareness is often associated with poor weather, aircraft emergencies and other extreme situations. But more insidiously, loss of situational awareness also occurs in good visual conditions during routine operations. An air carrier Captain describes a case in point: While being vectored on a downwind leg to Runway 01L, Tower asked if we had the field in sight, which we did. At that time we were cleared for a visual approach to Runway 01L and a left turn back to the field was initiated to result in a final of approximately 6 miles. When approximately 60° from the runway heading, Tower reported traffic (a B-757) joining a final for runway 01R. While looking for the traffic the First Officer, who was flying the aircraft, took his eyes off the field and shallowed his bank... When I realized he was not just squaring off his final but was going to overshoot the runway I told him he was going to overshoot and ordered a turn back to our runway. He seemed disoriented and was slow in responding, resulting in a significant overshoot approaching the approach corridor for Runway 01R. A TCAS II-Resolution Advisory resulted with a monitor vertical speed command which was complied with. Tower questioned if we had the traffic in sight which we answered in the affirmative. We corrected back to the 01L centerline and landed with no further incident. In talking to the First Officer after the landing, he indicated that he lost sight of the runway in the left turn. Also that he never actually saw the B-757. Although I indicated that I saw the traffic and pointed it out, the First Officer did not see it, but I assumed he did. I also assumed that he had the runway in sight, so I was unaware that he had lost situational awareness. The lesson to me is to never assume another crew member is seeing the same thing I am and to work to communicate what I am seeing even when weather is good and easy visual approaches are being conducted. We trust this incident taught the First Officer the importance of communicating clearly with other crew when he does not have other traffic and the runway in sight.4. What is the result of the incident?
Situational Awareness–or SA as human factors specialists like to call it–is a term referring to pilots’ ability to keep the big picture in flight operations. This includes awareness of the aircraft’s location and attitude, its proximity to physical hazards and obstructions, weather and environmental factors, engine and systems status, task priority within the cockpit, and many other factors. Loss of situational awareness is often associated with poor weather, aircraft emergencies and other extreme situations. But more insidiously, loss of situational awareness also occurs in good visual conditions during routine operations. An air carrier Captain describes a case in point: While being vectored on a downwind leg to Runway 01L, Tower asked if we had the field in sight, which we did. At that time we were cleared for a visual approach to Runway 01L and a left turn back to the field was initiated to result in a final of approximately 6 miles. When approximately 60° from the runway heading, Tower reported traffic (a B-757) joining a final for runway 01R. While looking for the traffic the First Officer, who was flying the aircraft, took his eyes off the field and shallowed his bank... When I realized he was not just squaring off his final but was going to overshoot the runway I told him he was going to overshoot and ordered a turn back to our runway. He seemed disoriented and was slow in responding, resulting in a significant overshoot approaching the approach corridor for Runway 01R. A TCAS II-Resolution Advisory resulted with a monitor vertical speed command which was complied with. Tower questioned if we had the traffic in sight which we answered in the affirmative. We corrected back to the 01L centerline and landed with no further incident. In talking to the First Officer after the landing, he indicated that he lost sight of the runway in the left turn. Also that he never actually saw the B-757. Although I indicated that I saw the traffic and pointed it out, the First Officer did not see it, but I assumed he did. I also assumed that he had the runway in sight, so I was unaware that he had lost situational awareness. The lesson to me is to never assume another crew member is seeing the same thing I am and to work to communicate what I am seeing even when weather is good and easy visual approaches are being conducted. We trust this incident taught the First Officer the importance of communicating clearly with other crew when he does not have other traffic and the runway in sight.3. When did the pilot lose sight of the runway?
